

City of San Antonio, Texas
Police Department

Use of Force Analysis
July 1, 2001 – December 31, 2002

Final Report

11/6/03

conducted and prepared by

William Terrill, Ph.D

This project was supported by grant #2002HSWX0032 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Points of view or opinions contained in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Sgt. Anthony Trevino, Bart Mulcahy, Sonya Groves, The Strategic Mapping and Analysis Unit, Lt. Quinton Lashbrook, Dr. Carla Zaine, as well as any other departmental employee, who have taken the time to provide the many pieces of information found throughout this report. The multi-stage design employed here would not have been possible without their contributions. Thank you for your time and effort.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Stage 1. The Nature and Scope of Force 3

A. Force in General 3

B. Officer Characteristics 11

C. Citizen Characteristics 20

D. Officer/Citizen Characteristics 24

E. Higher/Lower Force Officer Comparisons 28

Stage 2. Force and Location 35

Stage 3. Force and Citizen Complaints 44

Stage 4. Force and Arrest 47

Stage 5. Force and Contextual Influences 57

Summary and Discussion 61

Future Efforts 69

Bibliography 77

Glossary 79

Appendix 82

Introduction

Relying on use of force data collected by San Antonio police officers from July 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002, as well as numerous additional information sources supplied by the San Antonio Police Department (e.g., officer background characteristics, citizen complaint data, crime data, arrest data), this study examines police use of force in a variety of contexts. The primary intent is to examine the scope and nature of force, and identify salient factors, issues, and trends with respect to police use of force practices. To this end, a five stage analysis was conducted. It is hoped that such information will be beneficial to police managers and line level officers alike.

The first stage entails a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation so as to identify the scope and nature of force used during the study period. Specific emphasis is given to examining how force varies across a number of officer (e.g., race, sex, experience, education) and citizen (e.g., race, sex, age) characteristics. In addition, various officer/citizen combinations are examined (e.g., officer/citizen race). Finally, a series of comparisons are made between officers who generate a higher number of force reports to those who generate a lower number of force reports.

The second stage focuses on the potential influence of district location. In particular, specific attention is given to examining "where" officers use force and whether force differs from

one area to another. Primary attention is placed on determining if officers are more likely to rely on coercive means in the highest crime areas of the city.

In the third stage, use of force report data are compared against citizen complaint data. The benefit of examining force report and citizen complaint data is that each offers a picture of force from different perspectives (i.e., one from the officer and the other from the citizen). Such a comparison provides the opportunity to determine if both indicators of behavior are pointing in the same, or a different, direction.

The fourth stage involves a comparison of force incidents and arrests. Given the underlying coercive nature of the arrest function, it is important to examine the extent to which officers rely on force in arrest cases. Moreover, this analysis seeks to determine how citizen and officer characteristics differ across arrests that result in the filing of a use of force report and those that do not.

While the original intent of the fifth and final stage was to conduct contextual analyses based on situational factors that have been shown to influence the application of police use of force (e.g., encounter initiation, citizen impairment, bystanders present, type of problem), the lack of available information in the force data set limits this analysis. Nonetheless, several factors are examined including the type of problem, as well backup and supervisory presence and actions.

In the following sections the methodology and results are presented for each of the five stages. A summary and discussion section is then presented, which summarizes and integrates the results as a whole. Finally, the last section contains recommendations for future data collection and analyses.

Stage 1

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF FORCE

A. FORCE IN GENERAL

At the outset it is important to identify and clarify the term "force" within the context of this study. Use of the phrase or term "use of force" is generally meant to mean a type or level of force that triggers a use of force report according to San Antonio Police Department policy. Thus, while simple restraints and handcuffs are physical forms of force (and commands and threats are forms of verbal coercion) in a literal sense, they are not considered or referred to here as such because this form of force does not reach the threshold required to trigger the filing of a use of force report. As a result, reference to force throughout this report generally involves force above and beyond open/empty hand control techniques and excludes handcuffing (see San Antonio Police Department, Procedure 501, Use of Force for further detail).

In addition to identifying how the term force is used here, it is even more critical to state a key limitation of the study. Based on the data sources used for this study there is no way to establish or determine inappropriate force. As such, it is vital that results are *not* viewed within the context of excessive or improper force. Within this context, any noted disparity does not inherently mean the prejudicial application of force. In other words, there may be legally justifiable reasons for why such disparity exists. What is offered here is nothing more than a description of the number of force reports broken down by various factors (ie., officer, citizen

race), which does not account for all the potentially valid reasons for why some officers may use force more readily, or why officers may chose to use force more frequently on some groups (e.g., Black citizens) and less on others (e.g., White citizens). In particular, there is no measure of citizen resistance, which would allow for the introduction of statistical control and permit a more definitive answer to whether any noted disparities in force usage are the result of such resistance or the result of other factors (i.e., race, age, etc.).¹

The initial analysis centers on examining the general scope and nature of force used in San Antonio in an attempt to get a sense of how many force reports were filed by officers during the July 1,2001 - December, 31, 2002 time period, the different types and combinations of types of force used, and the extent to which force usage was spread among many officers or concentrated within a smaller number of officers.

In total, San Antonio police officers filed 1,066 use of force reports involving 855 separate incidents and consisting of 883 citizens and 520 officers. Nearly two-thirds (n==700, 65.7%) of the 1,066 total reports involved one officer and one citizen, while the remaining 34.3 percent (n==366) involved multiple parties in some format (e.g., one officer/multiple citizens, one citizen/multiple officers). Further, the primary reporting officer lists an assisting officer 88.1 percent (n==940) of the time and a second assisting officer 73.2 percent (n=780) of the time. Hence, while most police-citizen encounters resulting in force involved only one officer per se, in terms of reaching a level of force requiring a report, in nearly 9 out of 10 cases other officers

¹ It should also be pointed out, given reporting procedures concerning the level of force required to trigger a force report, that analyses on force severity is restricted. In short, the type of force collected falls primarily at the top of the force continuum (i.e., that which is above and beyond open/empty hand control techniques and excludes handcuffing), thereby limiting comparisons to lesser forms of force (i.e., verbal or low level physical restraint). This does not imply that city officials should alter the reporting procedure, only that the analyses are limited to more severe forms of physical force.

were involved in assisting the primary officer.

When the total number of force reports filed is compared to the roughly 1,100,944 calls for service generated over 18 months in 2001 and 2002, officers used force in about one of every 1,033 police-citizen contacts. Alternatively, officers resort to force 9.68 times per 10,000 calls for service, or about one-tenth of one-percent (.096%) of all contacts?² If the rate of force is compared to the total population, the rate is 93.1 per 100,000³, a rate nearly identical (94.6 per 100,000) to that reported in a survey conducted by the International City Managers Association (ICMA) consisting of 125 southern departments (see Alpert and MacDonald, 2001: pgs. 402-403).⁴

In accordance with San Antonio Police Department, Form 62, Use of Force (Aug 01), officers record force into four main categories: hands, ASP, DC spray, and firearm. Table 1.1 shows the frequency breakdown of these various types of force. Not surprisingly, officers were

² Note that calls for service numbers are taken directly from the San Antonio Police Department website (<http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapdlpdfcallsSubs.pdt>) with year 2001 total number of calls split in half to account for only six months of force reporting data.

³ Based on 2000 U.S. Census total city population of 1,144,646 minus 17,033 for those not specifically identified as one of the four classifications used here (e.g., those who identified themselves as two or more races).

⁴ One must use caution when making comparisons across studies due to methodological differences in particular (i.e., most studies do not measure force in the exact manner as the San Antonio police department, or rely strictly on officer reporting). In addition, as noted by Alpert and MacDonald, "(t)here is no national reporting system on this subject (force), no state that maintains a complete database, and no standard for collecting use-of-force data at the agency level" (2001: p. 394). While there has been a federal push for such a system for nearly a decade (specifically in relation to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Section 210402), to date one simply does not exist in any systematic manner. While an ongoing study by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is making an attempt to collect force data nationally, the latest findings from this study (2001) should be viewed with extreme caution, especially in relation to comparisons made to San Antonio as only 5 of the 238 (of some 18,000 departments nationwide) participating departments are similar in size. Further, results for cities similar in size to San Antonio (1 million plus) and based on data collected in 1998, show a rate of force at 8.93 per 10,000 calls for service (compared to San Antonio's rate of 9.68 per 10,000 calls for service). The following year, 1999, the rate in the IACP study dropped dramatically to 1.75, which raises a high degree of suspicion as per reporting procedures. As a result, throughout the present report, an attempt is made to base comparisons on a totality of evidence accumulated over numerous studies, most of which are more empirical or scientific in nature.

most likely to use their hands (n=852, 79.9%) when attempting to control citizens. Of the remaining categories, officers used OC spray in 103 (9.7%) of the cases, an ASP in 82 (7.7%), and a firearm in 75 (7.0%). While caution is required when comparing findings across force studies, previous studies on police use of force confirm this pattern of force usage as being the norm (i.e., that officers are more likely to rely on their hands than intermediate weapons or potentially lethal force) (see Terrill, 2003: pgs. 52-54, 65-70; Worden and Shelagh, 2002: pgs. 94-96).

Table 1.1 Extent of Force by Type (N=1,066)

Force Type	Number of Reports*	Percent
Hands	852	79.9
OC Spray	103	9.7
ASP	82	7.7
Firearm * *	75	7.0
Other	142	13.3

*Total does not sum to 1,066 due to multiple types of force used in some incidents. **Of the 75 reported uses of a firearm, 12 resulted in shots fired.

In addition to the main types of force captured in the use of force reports, officers also reported 142 (13.3%) instances where they used some form of "other" force. Table 1.2 classifies these into one of nine categories and shows the extent to which each type of behavior was reported by officers. The most frequent type of force reported was the use of legs and/or feet at 9.1 percent (n=97). Use of the flashlight was a distant second at 1.1 percent (n=12). The remaining types of force all occurred less than one percent of the time. Such findings are also expected based on past research regarding police use of force (Terrill, 2003: pgs. 52-54; 65-70).

Table 1.2 Extent of "Other" Force by Type (N=142)

Force Type	Number of Reports	Percent*
Legs/Feet	97	9.1
Flashlight	12	1.1
Pepperball Launcher	8	.8
Baton/Nightstick	6	.6
Body/Tackle	5	.5
Radio	3	.3
K9	3	.3
Non-lethal Shotgun	3	.3
Vehicle	1	.1
Misc.	4	.4

*Percent of total number of force reports (N=1,066).

Table 1.3 further breaks down the types of force officers use by detailing the various types of combinations used in each of the 1,066 police-citizen encounters resulting in a report. Once again, officers primarily rely on their hands to control citizens - whether used in isolation (hands only) or with other forms of force (hands and legs, hands and ASP, etc.). Table 1.3 also reflects the fact that officers most frequently rely on only one form of force (n=886, 83.1 %). In only 16.9 percent (n=180) of the cases did officers resort to multiple types of force within the same encounter. While it is difficult to firmly place this into context, it is clear that officers do not regularly engage in the use of multiple types of force within individual encounters.

Table 1.3 Force Type Combinations (N=1,066)

Force Combination	Number of Reports	Percent
Hands	697	65.3
OC Spray	72	6.7
Hands, Legs	69	6.4
Firearm	48	4.5
ASP	39	3.6
Hands, ASP	28	2.6
Legs	17	1.5
Hands, OC	14	1.3
Hands, Firearm	14	1.3
Hands, Flashlight	6	.6
Flashlight	6	.6
Hands, ASP, OC Spray	5	.5
OC Spray, Pepperball Launcher	5	.5
Hands, Legs, Firearm	4	.4
ASP, OC Spray	3	.3
K9	3	.3
Pepperball Launcher, Firearm	3	.3
Non-lethal shotgun, Firearm	3	.3
Hands, Misc	3	.3
Hands, Legs, ASP	2	.2
Hands, Legs, OC	2	.2
Hands, Baton	2	.2
Hands, Body/Tackle	2	.2
Hands, Radio	2	.2

Force Combination	Number of Reports	Percent
Legs, Firearm	2	.2
Baton	2	.2
Body, Tackle	2	.2
Hands, ASP, Firearm	1	.1
ASP, Firearm	1	.1
ASP, Baton	1	.1
ASP, Body Tackle	1	.1
ASP, Legs	1	.1
OC Spray, Fire	1	.1
OC Spray, Baton	1	.1
Radio	1	.1
Vehicle	1	.1
Hands, Other (not specified)	1	.1
Misc. (multiple types)	1	.1
Total	1066	1100.0

Table 1.4 examines the number of officers by the number of force reports filed. Such an analysis provides a picture of how concentrated or dispersed force usage is among officers. Forty-seven officers (9.0% of the 520 officers filing reports during the study time) filed five or more force reports accounting for 30.3 percent (n=323) of the total number of use of force reports. Seventy-two officers (13.9%) filed three or four reports accounting for 22.0 percent (n=235) of the total number of reports. Finally, 401 officers (77.1 %) filed one or two reports accounting for 47.7 percent (n=508) of the total number of reports. Aggregating and summarizing these findings show:

- 22.9 percent of the officers in the use of force database account for 52.3 percent of the total number of reports.
- 77.1 percent of the officers in the use of force database account for 47.7 percent of the total number of reports.

Put another way, just less than one-fourth of the officers account for just over one-half of all force reports; while just over three-fourths of the officers account for just under one-half of all force reports. It is important to note that such a skewed distribution is more the norm than the exception (see for instance National Institute of Justice, 1999: pg. viii; Alpert and MacDonald, 2001: p. 395; Worden and Shelagh, 2002: p. 99-100).

Table 1.4 Number of Officers by Number of Force Reports

Number of Officers	Number of Force Reports	Percentage of Force Reports
5	10+	6.8
3	9	2.5
1	8	.8
5	7	3.3
15	6	8.5
18	5	8.5
19	4	7.1
53	3	14.9
107	2	20.0
294	1	27.6
Total 520	1066	100.0

B. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

This analysis focuses on officer characteristics such as race, sex, education, experience, and assignment. The objective is to determine the extent to which disparity exists across these various officer dimensions. Table 1.5 offers a breakdown of officer race by the number of force reports filed.⁵ As shown, White and Hispanic officers account for nearly 95 percent of all force reports (n=1,008). White officers account for the most reports with 52.3 percent (n=557), while Hispanic officers account for 42.3 percent (n=451). Combined, Black and Asian officers only filed 58 (5.4%) reports over the 18-month period. While the distribution is clearly skewed rather heavily, such a finding must be put into context within the realm of how race is distributed across personnel. For instance, White officers make up 49.2 percent (n=1,012) of the total number of officers (N=2,056) in the department, Hispanics 44.5 percent (n=914), Blacks 5.7 percent (n=117), and Asians 0.6 percent (n=12). If these figures are compared against the force usage distribution the percentage are very similar. White and Hispanic officers make up 93.7 percent of the department and account for 94.6 percent of the force reports; Black and Asian officers make up 6.3 percent of the department while accounting for 5.4 percent of the force reports. In general, most research has not found officer race to be a predictor of force (see Terrill, 2001: p. 19).⁶

⁵ Tables using the number of unique officers as the unit of analysis are listed in the Appendix section at the end of the report.

⁶ If personnel percentages are restricted to police and probationary officers, arguably the most likely to have opportunities to use force, the percentage breakdown is as follows: Whites, 44.7%; Hispanics, 48.4%, Blacks, 6.1 %, Asians, 0.8%.

Table 1.5 Officer Race by Number of Force Reports - Total (N=1,066)

Race	Number of Reports	Percent
White	557	52.3
Hispanic	451	42.3
Black	31	2.9
Asian	27	2.5
Total	1066	100.0

Table 1.6 shows a breakdown of officer sex by the number of force reports filed. As seen, the distribution is overwhelmingly male. Male officers account for 1,049 of the 1,066 (98.4%) reports filed, while females used force in only 1.6 percent (n=17). Comparatively, males make up 93.1 percent (n=1,915 officers) of the department, while females account for 6.9 percent of departmental personnel (n=141 officers).⁷ Thus, males are somewhat over-represented in the force data set. Prior research does indicate that male officers have been found to be more forceful in their approach to police-citizen encounters, although the rigor of such research is not overly strong (Terrill, 2001: p. 19).

Table 1.6 Officer Sex by Number of Force Reports - Total (N=1,066)

Sex	Number of Reports	Percent
Male	1049	98.4
Female	17	1.6
Total	1066	100.0

⁷ Restricting personnel percentages to police and probationary officers results in: males, 94.0% and females, 6.0%.

Table 1.7 offers a look at officer educational levels and the use of force. As seen in Table 1.7, those with some college but no degree represent the largest percentage of force reports (58.8%, n=627). However, the table also shows that 27.8 percent (n=296) of the reports were filed by officers with a Bachelor degree, while less than half that (12.2%, n=130) were filed by officers with an Associate degree. Some research on officer education has shown that less educated officers are more prone to force, while some studies show the opposite (see Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002: p. 238).

Table 1.7 Officer Education by Number of Force Reports. Total (N=1,066)

Education Level	Number of Reports	Percent
High School or Less	5	.5
Some College	627	58.8
Associates Degree	130	12.2
Bachelors Degree	296	27.8
Masters Degree	8	.8
Total	1066	100.0

Table 1.8 examines officer experience and the use of force. A clear pattern can be seen here with respect to officers with the least amount of experience accounting for a large percentage of force usage. For instance, officers with five or less years of experience account for nearly half (n=521, 48.9%) of the 1,066 total reports. If officers with 10 or less years of experience are factored in the number of force reports increases to almost 80 percent (n=851).⁸ Once again, the evidence on the association between experience and force is mixed (see Terrill

⁸ Note that the number of total officers in the department with less than 10 years of experience is 928, 45.1 percent of departmental personnel. When just police and probationary officers are considered, there are 805 officers with less than 10 years of experience (59.1 %).

and Mastrofski, 2002: pgs. 220 & 238). Extra caution is required when interpreting this finding since officers with less experience tend to work street level assignments (and hence have increased opportunities to engage in force) to a much greater degree than more seasoned veterans - simply based on the promotion structure within the police agency.

Table 1.8 Officer Years on the Job
by Number of Force Reports - Total (N=1,066)

Years on Job	Number of Reports	Percent
1	165	15.5
2	114	10.7
3	89	8.3
4	70	6.6
5	83	7.8
<i>Sum total 1-5</i>	521	48.9
6	78	7.3
7	89	8.3
8	102	9.6
9	33	3.1
10	28	2.6
<i>Sum total 6-10</i>	330	30.9
11	15	1.4
12	39	3.7
13	35	3.3
14	23	2.2
15	13	1.2
<i>Sum total 11-15</i>	125	11.8

Years on Job	Number of Reports	Percent
16	21	2.0
17	13	1.2
18	7	.7
19	9	.8
20	6	.6
<i>Sum total 16-20</i>	56	5.3
21	3	.3
22	2	.2
23	1	.1
24	1	.1
25	5	.5
<i>Sum total 21-25</i>	12	1.2
26	1	.1
27	3	.3
28	6	.6
29	3	.3
30	1	.1
<i>Sum total 26-30</i>	14	1.4
31	4	.4
32	3	.3
33	1	.1
<i>Sum total 31-33</i>	8	.8
Overall Total	1066	100.0

Table 1.9 provides insight into which assigned units generate the most force reports. In total, there were 48 units represented in the force database. Of these, half filed 10 or less reports, while half filed more than 10. Despite this even distribution, several units in the latter half filed a relatively large number of reports. The top two units, Central and West Patrol dogwatch, account for nearly a quarter of the total number of reports (23.3%, n=248).

Table 1.9 Officer Assignment by Force Reports - Individual Units (N=1,066)

Assigned Unit	Number of Force Reports	Percent
Central Patrol C Shift	146	13.7
West Patrol C Shift	102	9.6
West Patrol B Shift	94	8.8
South Patrol B Shift	79	7.4
Central Patrol B Shift	50	4.7
South Patrol C Shift	43	4.0
East Patrol C Shift	42	3.9
East Patrol B Shift	41	3.8
North Patrol B Shift	40	3.8
Prue Patrol C Shift	38	3.6
West Patrol A Shift	34	3.2
Repeat Offender Program Unit	31	2.9
North Patrol C Shift	31	2.9
Central Patrol A Shift	30	2.8
Foot/Bike Evenings	26	2.4
Narcotics Unit	24	2.3
S.W.A.T. Detail B	23	2.2
Prue Patrol B Shift	22	2.1

Assigned Unit	Number of Force Reports	Percent
South Patrol A Shift	22	2.1
Foot/Bike Dogwatch	19	1.8
Traffic Control F	18	1.7
Foot/Bike Days	17	1.6
North Patrol A Shift	17	1.6
East Patrol A Shift	12	1.1
S.W.A.T. Detail A	10	.9
Prue Patrol A Shift	7	.7
Traffic Control E	6	.6
Vice Unit	4	.4
Night Detective Unit	4	.4
Traffic Control D	4	.4
K9 Detail	4	.4
Training Academy Section	3	.3
West Community Service	3	.3
Central Community Service	2	.3
East Community Service	2	.3
Homicide Unit	2	.2
Youth Crime Services Unit	2	.2
Technical Task Force	2	.2
East Investigative Detail	1	.1
Vehicle Crimes Unit	1	.1
North Community Service	1	.1
Prue Community Service	1	.1
Patrol Division Administration	1	.1

Assigned Unit	Number of Force Reports	Percent
Prue Investigative Detail	1	.1
Street Crime Arrest Team A	1	.1
Crisis Negotiation Detail	1	.1
Traffic E Motorcycle Detail	1	.1
Technical Support Section	1	.1
Total	1066	100.0

Table 1.10 offers a slightly different look at assignment. When assignment is aggregated into service areas the Central and West, as a whole, account for about half of all reports (n=523, 49.1 %). The top ranking area (i.e., Central) had approximately four times the number of reports than the Northwest area, three times the North and East service areas, and twice the South.

When calls for service are used for comparative purposes (as a means to consider how busy each area is, and hence one measure for determining "opportunity" for forceful behavior) and the force rate is standardized to 10,000 calls for service, the rate is 17.45 in the West, compared to the remaining service areas: South (10.05), West (9.98), East (7.37), North (4.57%), and Northwest (3.06%). Thus, although force usage is infrequent overall (even in the Central force is only used in 0.17% of all contacts, less than one-quarter of one-percent), there are rather pronounced differences when comparing rates across assignment areas.⁹ Finally, Table 1.11 shows the 850 of 1,066 reports filed by officers working one of the three assigned patrol shifts. As seen, most

⁹ It is important to note that a) one cannot presume that all calls for service contacts offer the same degree of conflict probability. In other words, areas with a higher number of calls for service may be disproportionately geared toward low-level, non-crime related behavior requests while areas with a lower number of calls for service may actually constitute more high-level, crime related behavior requests; and b) the calls for service numbers used here are taken from the San Antonio Police Department website and "do NOT include expedited calls, calls dispatched to specialized units, or calls initiated by officers of specialized units" (<http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapdlpdf/callsSubs.pdf>).

reports were filed by officers assigned the night shift (n=402, 47.3%).

Table 1.10 Officer Assignment by Force Reports - Area (N=1,066)

Assigned Area	Number of Force Reports	Percent
Central Patrol	290	27.2
West Patrol	233	21.9
South Patrol	144	13.5
East Patrol	98	9.2
North Patrol	89	8.3
Technical Services	71	6.7
Northwest Patrol	70	6.6
Investigations	68	6.4
Resource Management	3	.3
Total	1066	100.0

Table 1.11 Patrol Shift by Force Reports (N=850)

Patrol Shift	Number of Force Reports	Percent
Days 06:30 - 14:30 Hours	122	14.3
Evenings 14:30 - 22:30 Hours	326	38.4
Dogwatch 22:30 - 06:30 Hours	402	47.3
Total	850	100.0

C. CITIZEN CHARACTERISTICS

Several citizen characteristics were examined in terms of force reporting. The initial analysis was conducted on citizen race and the use of force by police officers. Table 1.12 breaks down race into one of four categories captured in the data: Hispanic, White, Black, and Asian.¹⁰ As shown, Hispanics account for the greatest number of reports at 64.9 percent (n=690), followed by Whites (19.4%, n=206), Blacks (15.1 %, n=161), and Asians (0.6, n=6). Comparatively, Hispanics account for 59.5 percent (n=671,394) of the population, Whites 32.3 percent (n=364,357), Blacks 6.6 percent (n=74,778), and Asians 1.5 percent (n=17,084).

From a descending order of magnitude, the percentage breakdown is identical. However, comparing percentages between force usage and the population, Hispanics and Blacks are over represented in the force data set, while Whites and Asians are under-represented. The degree of over/under representation varies. The difference for Hispanics is about 5 percent. For Blacks, the difference is more than twice the population percentage or an 8.5 percent difference. Conversely, Whites are under-represented by about 13.0 percent, as are Asians (although caution is required when viewing this result since the number of cases are so few, n=6).

¹⁰ Tables using the number of unique citizens as the unit of analysis are listed in the Appendix section at the end of the report.

Table 1.12 Citizen Race by Number of Force Reports - Total (N=1,063)*

Race	Number of Reports	Percent
Hispanic	690	64.9
White	206	19.4
Black	161	15.1
Asian	6	.6
Total	1063	100.0

*citizen race information missing on 3 reports.

Given the importance of race in police-citizen relations, a series of additional analyses were done that distinguishes citizen race by different types of force. Findings from these analyses are presented in Table 1.13. Beginning with force that constituted use of the hands, little difference exists across race categories. For example, officers used their hands in 81.3 percent of the reports when dealing with Hispanics, compared to 79.5 percent with Blacks and 77.2 percent with Whites. The chi-square statistic, the proper statistical test to be used when comparing nominal factors, indicates no statistical difference between races with respect to this type of force.¹¹ Similarly, no significant difference exists across race in regard to OC spray.

¹¹ Chi-square tests for the difference between observed and expected frequencies based on the assumption of independence. A result of $p < .05$, the conventional standard used to test independence in social science inquires (see Loether and McTavish, 1993: p. 484), indicates a significant difference - simply meaning that the difference is probabilistically not due to chance, although still possible. In short, a statistically significant finding indicates a high probability that the observed difference is in fact real (meaning an increased proclivity as opposed to a random occurrence) (see Fox, Levin, and Shively, 1999: p. 245-259; and Loether and McTavish, 1993, p. 574-580 for a more in-depth examination of Chi-Square specifically, and tests of independence more generally).

Additionally, one should not confuse substantive differences with statistically significant differences, or lack thereof. In other words, while an effect may fail to meet a statistical criterion (i.e., a statistically significant difference), this does not necessarily equate to the lack of a substantive difference. Hypothetically, for example, if 14 White citizens were shot and killed compared to 10 Asian citizens there may not be a statistically significant difference, but one may argue or feel the difference is nonetheless substantial.

In the following paragraphs and sections, the reader is cautioned when attempting to interpret findings

Table 1.13 Citizen Race by Types of Force - Total (N=1,063)

Type of Force*	Citizen Race				p-Level
	Hispanic n (%)	White n (%)	Black n (%)	Asian n (%)	
Hands	561 (81.3)	159 (77.2)	128 (79.5)	4 (66.7)	.485
ASP	39 (5.7)	17 (8.3)	25 (15.5)	1 (16.7)	.000
OC Spray	60 (8.7)	20 (9.7)	23 (14.3)	0 (0.0)	.150
Fireann	42 (6.1)	21 (10.2)	7 (4.3)	2 (33.3)	.006
Other	102 (14.8)	29 (14.1)	11 (6.8)	0 (0.0)	.043

*Note: figures do not sum to designated totals by race category (Le., Hispanic, n=690; White, n=206; Black, n=161; Asian, n=6) due to multiple types of force used in some incidents.

With respect to the ASP, firearm, and "other" types of force, there is a statistically significant difference by race, although the effects differ. For instance, officers were more likely to use their ASP in encounters with Blacks (15.5%) compared to Whites (8.3%) and Hispanics (5.7%), but more likely to use their firearm when dealing with Whites (10.2%) compared to Hispanics (6.1 %) and Blacks (4.3%). Officers were also more likely to use force labeled as "other" in encounters with Hispanics and Whites. Research on race and police use of force has produced mixed results (see Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002: pgs. 217-221,236; Worden and Shelagh, 2002: pgs. 96-99).

In addition to race, citizen sex and age were also examined. Table 1.14 presents the frequency and percentage of reports by sex. Just over 9 out of 10 (n=963, 90.6%) force reports

where a statistically significant finding is uncovered when no other factors are considered that may explain observed differences. For example, officers may use their firearm more often in encounters with Whites not due to any bias based on race, but because the White citizens encountered were more likely to offer a level of resistance that threatened the officers' life, thereby justifying use of the firearm.

involved male citizens. Table 1.15 shows the age breakdown. As shown, nearly 25 percent (n=258) of the force encounters involved citizens who were 20 or under. The largest age group involved those in their 20's (n=360, 34.1 %). Thus, 58.5 percent all encounters involved citizens under 30. Prior research, while not overly widespread, generally shows that officers are more likely to use force during encounters with males and younger citizens (see Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002: p. 236).

Table 1.14 Citizen Sex by Number of Force Reports. Total (N=1,063)*

Sex	Number of Reports	Percent
Male	963	90.6
Female	100	9.4
Total	1063	100.0

*citizen sex information missing on 3 reports.

Table 1.15 Citizen Age by Number of Force Reports. Total (N=1,055)*

Ethnicity	Number of Reports	Percent
17 and under	111	10.5
18-20	147	13.9
21-29	360	34.1
30-39	253	24.0
40-49	146	13.8
50-59	32	3.0
60 and over	6	.6
Total	1055	100.0

*citizen age information missing on 11 reports.

D. OFFICER/CITIZEN CHARACTERISTICS

In addition to looking at officer and citizen characteristics singularly, several were looked at together. Given that information is only available on three citizen characteristics, and the fact that little variation exists within gender and most force involved young citizens, emphasis is placed on looking at citizen race and a number of officer characteristics. Table 1.16 shows a cross tabulation between officer and citizen race by the number of force reports filed. While officers of all races were most likely to use force on Hispanic citizens, Table 1.16 shows that officers and citizens of the same race generally prompted the most frequent force when comparing across officer race. In other words, officers tend to use force more readily within race.

Table 1.16 Number of Force Reports: Officer Race by Citizen Race (N=1,063)

		<i>Officer</i>			
		Hispanic n (%)	White n (%)	Black n (%)	Asian n (%)
<i>Citizen Race</i>	Hispanic	316 (70.4)	340 (61.2)	20 (64.5)	14 (51.9)
	White	70 (15.6)	125 (22.5)	4 (12.9)	7 (25.9)
	Black	61 (13.6)	87 (15.6)	7 (22.6)	6 (22.2)
	Asian	2 (0.4)	4 (0.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
	Totals	449 (100.0)	556 (100.0)	31 (100.0)	27 (100.0)

Chi Square=14.86. p=.095

For example, Hispanic officers were most likely to use force on Hispanic citizens. Just over 70 percent of all encounters with Hispanic officers involved a Hispanic citizen, compared to 64.5 percent for the Black officer/Hispanic citizen dyad, 61.2 percent for White officer/Hispanic citizen, and 51.9 percent for Asian officer/Hispanic citizen. For Whites, 22.5 percent of all encounters involving White officers also involved a White suspect, compared to 15.6 percent within the Hispanic officer group and 12.9 within the Black officer group. Further, a similar pattern emerges within the Black officer grouping where 22.6 percent of all such encounters involved a Black citizen, compared to 15.6 percent for the White officer/Black citizen and 13.6 percent for the Hispanic officer/Black citizen dyads. The Asian group was the only exception, but based on a minimal number of cases. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the differences do not reach a level of statistical significance as evidenced by the chi-square.

The next table offers a look at the number of force reports by location and race (Table 1. 17a). With respect to Hispanics, the highest percentage of force reports is found in the South (84.7%, 144 of the 170 total reports filed involved a Hispanic citizen), followed by the West (76.5%) and Central (67.1 %). For Whites, the highest percentage is in the North (45.3%) followed by the Northwest (31.0%). For Blacks, the highest percentage is in the East (45.9%) followed by the North (29.2%). The resulting differences are statistically significant.

Table 1.17a Number of Force Reports: Location by Citizen Race (N=1,019)*

		<i>Location of Force</i>					
		Central n (%)	North n (%)	East n (%)	West n (%)	South n (%)	Northwest n (%)
Citizen Race	Hispanic	208 (67.1)	27 (25.5)	51 (45.9)	182 (76.5)	144 (84.7)	48 (57.1)
	White	61 (19.7)	48 (45.3)	9 (8.1)	35 (14.7)	19 (11.2)	26 (31.0)
	Black	38 (12.3)	31 (29.2)	51 (45.9)	19 (8.0)	6 (3.5)	10 (11.9)
	Asian	3 (1.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (0.8)	1 (0.6)	0 (0.0)
	Totals	310 (100.0)	106 (100.0)	111 (100.0)	238 (100.0)	170 (100.0)	84 (100.0)

*citizen race information missing on 3 reports, location information missing on 44 reports.

Chi-Square=217.30, p=.000

To place these percentages into context, Table 1.17b offers a race percentage comparison of each service area by population in relation to each service area by force. In some instances rather extreme differences are observed. For instance, Blacks are over-represented in the force data set in every service area, and show the most pronounced differences as well. For example, while Blacks represent 6.7 percent of the population in the North, 29.2 percent of the force reports generated in the North involve Blacks. Conversely, Whites are under-represented in four of the six areas (North, East, West, Northwest). Hispanics are also under-represented in four of the areas (Central, North, East, South), although over-represented in the Northwest.

Table 1.17b Percentage Comparisons: Population to Force Reports (N=1,019)

		<i>Location of Force</i>					
		Central Pop/Force	North Pop/Force	East Pop/Force	West Pop/Force	South Pop/Force	Northwest Pop/Force
<i>Citizen Race</i>	Hispanic	81.7/67.1	27.7/25.5	56.2/45.9	75.7/76.5	88.1/84.7	41.4/57.1
	White	13.5/19.7	58.7/45.3	16.2/8.1	16.2/14.7	9.6/11.2	46.8/31.0
	Black	2.7/12.3	6.7/29.2	25.2/45.9	4.6/8.0	1.1/3.5	4.3/11.9
	Asian	0.5/1.0	2.4/0.0	0.5/0.0	1.0/0.8	0.2/0.6	2.7/0.0

The final table (1.18) looks at the relationship between officer education and citizen race. For ease of presentation officer educational level was grouped in three categories of some college or less, Associate degree, and Bachelor degree or more. As can be seen, there is not a great deal of variation across educational levels by citizen race. The greatest difference is found within the Hispanic citizen group where officers with a Bachelor degree used force 61.2 percent of the time, while those with an Associate degree used force in 72.1 percent of the cases. Although those officers with an Associate degree were most likely to use force on Hispanic citizens, when compared to other officer education levels, they were least likely to use force with White, Black, and Asian citizens. Nonetheless, the noted differences are not statistically significant.

Table 1.18 Officer Education by Citizen Race (N=1,063)

		<i>Officer Level of Education</i>		
		Some College or < n (%)	Associate Degree n (%)	Bachelor Degree> n (%)
<i>Citizen Race</i>	Hispanic	411 (65.2)	93 (72.1)	186 (61.2)
	White	118 (18.7)	24 (18.6)	64 (21.1)
	Black	99 (15.7)	12 (9.3)	50 (16.4)
	Asian	2 (0.3)	0 (0.0)	4 (1.3)
	Totals	630 (100.0)	129 (100.0)	304 (100.0)

Chi-Square=10.13, p::::.119

E. HIGHER/LOWER FORCE OFFICER COMPARISONS

The final set of analyses in this stage involves examining officers who report force more frequently compared to those who report force less frequently, in relation to a number of officer and citizen characteristics. More specifically, officers with less than five reports (n=473) are compared against those with five or more reports (n=47).¹²

The first two tables compare the officer groups by officer race and age. With respect to race (Table 1.19), the differences between the two groups are minimal and not statistically

¹² As noted earlier, those with five or more force reports (n::::47) comprise 9.0 percent of the 520 total officers filing reports during the study period, which accounts for 30.3 percent (n::::323) of the total number of use of force reports. As such, it was decided to use five reports as a cutoff. In no way, however, should one take this to mean that these officers are being labeled problem officers (there is no way to determine this based on the available data), but rather only that this group of officers filed five or more force reports while the remaining group of officers filed less than five.

significant. For example, 49.5 percent (n=234) of the officers in the lower force group were White compared to 51.1 percent (n=24) of those in the higher force group. In terms of sex (Table 1.20), while the overall comparison is not statistically significant, it is important to note that all 12 of the females in the force data set fall into the lower force group.

Table 1.19 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Officer Race (N=520)

Officer Race	Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
White	234 (49.5)	24 (51.1)
Hispanic	213 (45.0)	20 (42.6)
Black	12 (2.5)	2 (4.3)
Asian	14 (3.0)	1 (2.1)
Total	473 (100.0)	47 (100.0)

Chi-Square=.652, p=.884

Table 1.20 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Officer Sex (N=520)

Officer Sex	Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
Male	461 (97.5)	47 (100.0)
Female	12 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Total	473 (100.0)	47 (100.0)

Chi-Square= 1.22, p=.269

Table 1.21 presents results from officer education. Here, the greatest distinction between the two groups of officers is found at the highest level of education. Of those in the lower force group, 25.8 percent (n=122) have a Bachelor's or Master's degree, compared to 31.9 percent (n=15) of those in the higher force group. Overall the differences found are not statistically significant.

Table 1.21 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Officer Education (N=520)

Officer Education	Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
High School or Less	286 (60.5)	27 (57.4)
Some <i>Collegel</i> Associates	65 (13.7)	5 (10.6)
Bachelors Masters	122 (25.8)	15 (31.9)
Total	473 (100.0)-1	47 (100.0)

Chi-Square=.979, p=.613

A comparison of the two groups in relation to officer experience is presented in Table 1.22. As shown, officers in the higher force group are significantly more likely to have less experience on the job. For instance, 68.1 percent (n=32) of the higher force officers have five or less years of experience compared to 41.4 percent (n=196) of those officers with similar experience in the lower force group. At the other end of the continuum, 13.7 percent (n=65) of the lower force group has 16 or more years of experience while no similarly experienced officers are found in the higher force group.

Table 1.22 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Officer Experience (N=520)

Officer Experience	Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
1-5 Years	196 (41.4)	32 (68.1)
6-10 Years	144 (30.4)	11 (23.4)
11-15 Years	68 (14.4)	4 (8.5)
16+ Years	65 (13.7)	0 (0.0)
Total	473 (100.0)	47 (100.0)

Chi-Square=15.15, p=.000

The next two comparisons examine assigned service unit and shift. Table 1.23 breaks down officers' assigned service unit. Over two-thirds (68.1 %, n=32 of 47) of those officers in the higher force group are assigned to either the Central or West. The greatest difference between the higher and lower force groups is found in the Central (44.7% versus 19.0%). With respect to shift (Table 1.24), 64.1 percent (n=25) of the higher force officers work the night shift compared to 35.7 percent (n=131) of those officers in the lower force group. Conversely, two of 39 officers (5.1 %) in the higher force group are assigned the day shift compared to 76 of 367 officers (20.7%) in the lower force group.

Table 1.23 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Assignment (N=520)

Service Area	Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
Central	90 (19.0)	21 (44.7)
West	92 (19.5)	11 (23.4)
South	75 (15.9)	4 (8.5)
East	46 (9.7)	3 (6.4)
North	51 (10.8)	3 (6.4)
Technical Services	37 (7.8)	3 (6.4)
Northwest	42 (8.9)	1 (2.1)
Investigations	37 (7.8)	1 (2.1)
Resource Management	3 (0.6)	0 (0.0)
Total	473 (100.0)	47 (100.0)

Chi-Square=21.01, p=.007

Table 1.24 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Officer Assigned Shift (N=406)

Officer Assigned Shift	Reports by Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
Day	76 (20.7)	2 (5.1)
Evening	160 (43.6)	12 (30.8)
Night	131 (35.7)	25 (64.1)
Total	367 (100.0)	39 (100.0)

Chi-Square=13.22, p=.001

The final three comparisons involve citizens characteristics. The first looks at citizen race. As shown in Table 1.25, 21.5 percent (n=159) of the encounters involving officers in the lower force group were with Whites citizens compared to 14.6 (n=47) of the encounters involving officers in the higher force group. Conversely, officers in the higher force group, compared to the lower force group, were more likely to report using force during encounters with Hispanic citizens (72.8% versus 61.5% respectively). The differences are statistically significant.

Table 1.25 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Citizen Race (N=1,063)

Citizen Race	Reports by Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
White	159 (21.5)	47 (14.6)
Hispanic	455 (61.5)	235 (72.8)
Black	121 (16.4)	40 (12.4)
Asian	5 (0.7)	1 (0.3)
Total	740 (100.0)	323 (100.0)

Chi-Square=12.85, p=.005

The last two comparisons involve citizen sex and age. As seen in Tables 1.26 and 1.27, there is very little variation between the two groups with respect to these two characteristics neither showing a statistically significant difference. In short, officers in both groups are just as likely to use force on males as females, as well as younger and older citizens.

Table 1.26 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Citizen Sex (N=1,066)

Citizen Sex	Reports by Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
Male	669 (90.4)	294 (91.0)
Female	71 (9.6)	29 (9.0)
Total	743 (100.0)	323 (100.0)

Chi-Square=.100, p=.752

Table 1.27 Comparison Between Officers with 5 or More Force Reports to Officers with Less than Five Force Reports: Citizen Age (N=1,055)

Citizen Age	Reports by Officers with:	
	Less than 5 n (%)	5 or More n (%)
> 17 Years	79 (10.7)	32 (10.0)
18-20 Years	97 (13.2)	50 (15.7)
21-29 Years	256 (34.8)	104 (32.6)
30-39 Years	167 (22.7)	86 (27.0)
40-49 Years	110 (14.9)	36 (11.3)
50-59 Years	22 (3.0)	10 (3.1)
60+ Years	5 (0.7)	1 (0.3)
Total	736 (100.0)	319 (100.0)

Chi-Square=5.79, p=.447

Stage 2

FORCE AND LOCATION

The following analysis focuses on the location or "where" officers use force. Numerous scholars and researchers have called attention to the importance of how police behavior differs across geographic space (Alpert and MacDonald, 2001; Slovak, 1986; Smith, 1986; Terrill and Reisig, 2003). The objective here is to examine if officers exercise force differently in some districts as opposed to others. More specifically, are officers more likely to apply force in high-crime districts? For this analysis San Antonio police officials provided two additional variables that were appended to the use of force report data file: (1) the district location where each use of force incident occurred, and (2) the number of Part I & IT crimes per district for the dates ranging from July 1,2001 to December 31,2002.

A total of 108 districts were identified in the use of force data set.¹³ Table 2.1 presents a breakdown depicting the number of force reports for each of the 108 districts. The average number of reports is 9.46 per district. As shown, 10 of the 108 districts (9.3%) had more than 18 force reports accounting for 23.7 percent of the total.¹⁴ The remaining 98 districts (90.7%) each had 18 or less reports, accounting for 76.3 percent of the total.

¹³ See Glossary for district breakdown by service area, and Appendix for map view.

¹⁴ Of the total number of force reports (N= 1 ,066), officials were unable to identify a district location for 44; hence, the total number of valid cases is 1,022.

Table 2.1 Number of Force Reports by District (N=1,022)*

District	Number of Reports	Percent
2320	34	3.3
2120	33	3.2
2130	26	2.5
4120	24	2.3
5240	24	2.3
5270	22	2.2
6150	21	2.1
2270	20	2.0
6140	20	2.0
2360	19	1.9
2370	18	1.8
5210	18	1.8
6120	18	1.8
6210	18	1.8
3330	17	1.7
5110	17	1.7
5170	17	1.7
6260	17	1.7
2310	16	1.6
6230	15	1.5
3310	14	1.4
4250	14	1.4
5150	14	1.4
5280	14	1.4

District	Number of Reports	Percent
6240	14	1.4
2150	13	1.3
5130	13	1.3
5260	13	1.3
2160	12	1.2
2220	12	1.2
2230	12	1.2
2240	12	1.2
5120	12	1.2
5140	12	1.2
5180	12	1.2
2110	11	1.1
3220	11	1.1
4220	11	1.1
6250	11	1.1
7180	11	1.1
2260	10	1.0
2280	10	1.0
2340	10	1.0
2350	10	1.0
4170	10	1.0
2380	9	.9
3320	9	.9
3340	9	.9
3360	9	.9

District	Number of Reports.	Percent
4150	9	.9
7290	9	.9
2210	8	.8
4210	8	.8
5220	8	.8
5250	8	.8
6160	8	.8
6170	8	.8
6270	8	.8
7320	8	.8
3250	7	.7
4140	7	.7
5310	7	.7
5330	7	.7
7240	7	.7
3210	6	.6
4110	6	.6
4160	6	.6
4260	6	.6
7160	6	.6
7270	6	.6
2140	5	.5
2250	5	.5
2330	5	.5
3350	5	.5

District	Number of Reports	Percent
4130	5	.5
5340	5	.5
6220	5	.5
7190	5	.5
7220	5	.5
7280	5	.5
4240	4	.4
5320	4	.4
5360	4	.4
6130	4	.4
7260	4	.4
3130	3	.3
3150	3	.3
3160	3	.3
3260	3	.3
5160	3	.3
5230	3	.3
5350	3	.3
6110	3	.3
7230	3	.3
7310	3	.3
7340	3	.3
3140	2	.2
3170	2	.2
3240	2	.2

District	Number of Reports	Percent
7150	2	.2
7170	2	.2
7330	2	.2
3110	1	.1
4180	1	.1
7110	1	.1
7120	1	.1
7130	1	.1
7250	1	.1
Total	1022	100.0

*Officials were unable to identify a district location for 44 reports.

Upon breaking down the number of force reports per district, the initial set of analyses (not shown in table format) involved looking at a simple correlation between force usage and the amount of crime by district to determine if areas with a higher number of crimes are also more likely to result in force. Crimes per area were broken down into three measures: total number of Part I & IT crimes, total number of Part I crimes, and total number of Part I violent crimes. Using district as the unit of analysis (N=108) showed no relationship between the number of force reports per district and the number of Part I and IT crimes (Pearson's $r=.042$, $p=.664$), nor between the number of force reports and Part I crimes (Pearson's $r=.003$, $p=.972$).¹⁵ However, a

¹⁵ Pearson's r is a statistical correlation measure of association. It offers a conservative test of whether force and crime by area are associated (i.e., whether there a greater frequency of force occurring in areas with more crime). Values range from -1.0 to 1.0, where -1.0 is a perfect negative (inverse) correlation, 0.0 is no correlation (i.e., no relationship), and 1.0 is a perfect positive correlation.

strong (and statistically significant) relationship was uncovered when examining the number of force reports and the number of violent crimes (Pearson's $r=.417$, $p=.000$). That is, officers were more likely to use force in areas of higher violent crime. Thus, at first glance and given a relatively conservative test, there is some reason to believe that officers are more likely to use force in areas with a higher number of crimes.

The second examination looks at district groupings by the number of force reports filed compared to the average number of crimes per district. Districts with more than 18 reports ($n=10$) are compared against those with 18 or less reports ($n=98$),¹⁶ Using the district as the unit of analysis, results for each of the crime measures are presented in Table 2.2.¹⁷

Table 2.2 Number of District Force Reports by Mean Number of Crimes per District (N=108)

Districts by # of Force Reports	Mean #:		
	Part I and n Crimes per District	Part I - All Crimes per District	Part I - Violent Crimes per District
Districts with 18 or more Force Reports	2273	1685	500
Districts with less than 18 Force Reports	2183	1667	438

When districts with 18 or more force reports are compared to those with less than 18, the average number of Part I and n crimes is 2,273 versus 2,183, a rather small difference. The difference is even smaller when only Part I crimes are considered (1,685 versus 1,667).

¹⁶ Using 18 as the cutoff seemed the most logical choice given the 18-month study time frame (e.g., one per month).

¹⁷ Results using the force report as the unit of analysis are shown in Table 2.2a located in the Appendix at the end of the report.

However, a more pronounced difference is found with respect to violent crime. In districts where officers rely on force more readily the average number of violent crimes is 500, compared to 438 in lower force districts (a 14.2% difference) - a finding supported both theoretically and empirically (see Alpert and MacDonald, 2001: 401-402; 405-406).

A final comparison is made by examining those districts with the greatest difference between the number of force reports and number of crimes. To do so, the distribution for both reports and crime were split into quartiles and those districts in the top quartile in one indicator and bottom quartile in another were identified. Table 2.3 offers results broken down by each of the crime measures. When looking at violent crime, five districts emerged as being distinct as shown in Table 2.3. As noted in the column labeled "Part 1 - Violent" in the left portion of the table, three of the districts (2130, 2270, 3310) ranked in the top 25 percent of force reporting and the bottom 25 percent of total number of crimes. In short, these three districts showed the most pronounced distinction with respect to relatively greater force usage in the least violent districts. Conversely, the pattern for two districts (5230, 7230) was reversed (column labeled "Part 1 Violent" in the right portion of the table). Each of these districts is located in the top quartile in terms of number of crimes, yet falls in the bottom quarter of force reporting. In essence, force was used relatively sparingly in these two districts even though crime was relatively plentiful. Finally, as demonstrated by the italicized label, one district in each instance is found regardless of the crime measure (e.g., district 2270, high force/low crime; district 5230, low force/high crime).

Table 2.3 Comparison Between Number of Force Reports per District and Number of Crimes per District - 1st and 4th Quartile Differences

Districts in 1 st Quartile of Force Reports			Districts in 4 th Quartile of Force Reports		
and 4 th <u>Quartile</u> of Number of Crimes:			and 1 st <u>Quartile</u> of Number Crimes:		
Part 1 & 2 - All	Part 1 - All	Part 1 - Violent	Part 1 & 2 - All	Part 1 - All	Part 1 - Violent
2270	2270	2130	3240	3240	5230
2360	2310	2270	4240	4240	7230
2370	2320	3310	5230	5230	---
6120	2360	---	7110	7110	---
---	2370	---	7150	7150	---
---	---	---	7230	7260	---
---	---	' ---	7260	---	---
n=4	n=5	n=3	n=7	n=6	n=2

Stage 3

FORCE AND CITIZEN COMPLAINTS

In this stage, use of *force* data is compared against citizen complaint data. The benefit of drawing on, and comparing, force report and citizen complaint data is that each offers a picture of *force from* different perspectives (Le., one *from* the officer and the other from the citizen). Such a comparison provides the opportunity to determine if both indicators of behavior are pointing in the same, or a different, direction. For example, are officers who generate more force reports also generating more citizen complaints? The greater the convergence of these measures the more confidence one may have in the findings (Le., a truly non-disparate or disparate effect that exists in terms of force usage). For this analysis San Antonio police officials provided two additional variables that were appended to the use of force report data file: (1) number of citizen complaints for improper "force," and (2) "total" number of citizen complaints for the dates ranging *from* January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2002.¹⁸

To investigate the potential connection between the number of force reports and citizen complaints two analyses were performed. The first involved looking at a simple correlation between the number of reports by an officer and number of complaints filed against the officer

¹⁸ When considering "force" complaints during the five-year period: 350 officers had zero complaints. 123 had one complaint. 38 had two complaints, seven had three complaints. and two had 4 complaints. When considering the "total" number of citizen complaints during the five-year period: 176 officers had zero complaints, 124 had one complaint. 90 had two complaints. 56 had three complaints, 30 had four complaints. and 44 had five or more complaints. Officials report that a total of 20 force complaints were received during the 18-month study period.

(not shown in table format). The findings revealed a statistically significant correlation between the number of use of force reports filed and both the number of "force" and "total" complaints filed by citizens. When comparing the number of force reports with the number of "force" complaints, the correlation was $r=.234$, $p<.01$ ¹⁹ When comparing the number of force reports with the number of "total" complaints, the correlation was $r=.200$, $p<.01$.²⁰ Simply put, officers who use force more often generate citizen complaints more frequently.

The second analysis examines officer groupings by the number of force reports filed compared to the average number of citizen complaints per officer. This is done in two different ways. First, officers with 10 or more reports ($n=5$) are compared against those with less than 10 reports ($n=515$). Second, officers with 5 or more reports ($n=47$) are compared to those with less than five reports ($n=473$). Using the officer as the unit of analysis, results are presented in Table 3.1.²¹

As shown in Table 3.1, four key comparisons are made. When officers with 10 or more force reports are compared to those with less than 10, the average number of "force" complaints for the former group is 1.20, which is substantially higher than .43 for the latter group. Similarly, the "total" number of citizen complaints per officer is also higher for officers who filed 10 or more force reports compared to those filing less than 10 reports (3.60 versus 1.67). A similar pattern, both in terms of "force" and "total" complaints per officer, can be seen when officers

¹⁹ Based on $N=520$ using the officer as the unit of analysis. When testing the correlation at the force report unit of analysis ($N=1,066$), the result was $r=.322$, $p<.01$.

²⁰ Based on $N=520$ using the officer as the unit of analysis. When testing the correlation at the force report unit of analysis ($N=1,066$), the result was $r=.272$, $p<.01$.

²¹ Results using the force report as the unit of analysis are shown in Table 3.1a located in the Appendix at the end of the report.

with five or more force reports are compared to those with less than five. In terms of "force" complaints, the mean rate for those officers with five or more reports is .74, while the average rate for those with less than five reports is .41. For "total" complaints, the mean rate for those officers with five or more reports is 2.53, while the average rate for those with less than five is 1.61.²²

Table 3.1 Number of Force Reports by Mean Number of Citizen Complaints per Officer (N=520)

<u>Officers by # of Force Reports</u>	Mean # of "Force" Complaints per Officer	Mean # of "Total" Complaints per Officer
<u>Officers with 10+ Force Reports</u>	1.20	3.60
<u>Officers with <10 Force Reports</u>	.43	1.67
<u>Officers with 5+ Force Reports</u>	.74	2.53
<u>Officers with <5 Force Reports</u>	.41	1.61

Three caveats are necessary when viewing and interpreting the results in this stage particularly. First, as with the analyses in the other stages, the information presented here should not be taken to mean any or all of the involved officers engaged in inappropriate force. The data source simply does not offer the ability to make such a conclusion. Second, it is possible, and perhaps even probable, that some officers generating a higher number of force reports and complaints are simply more productive officers - in the sense that they are more apt to actively engage the public (see Terrill and McCluskey, 2002). Third, the reader is cautioned that the complaint data used is based on the filing of such, not whether the complaint was sustained.

²² Note that these are "mean" (i.e., average) comparisons of groups as a whole and does not necessarily mean that all individuals generating a higher number of force reports also receive a higher number of citizen complaints. For example, two of the top five producing force report officers have zero force complaints.

Stage 4

FORCE AND ARREST

Given the underlying coercive nature of the arrest function, it is important to view the extent of force in the context of arrest and non-arrest cases. Further, given the potential confounding influence of citizen and officer characteristics across arrest and non-arrest cases, this analysis will look to determine how such influences are similar or dis-similar. For example, do officers use force more readily against Hispanic or Black citizens in the course of making an arrest compared to White citizens?

Prior to conducting bivariate and multivariate analyses, the initial analysis considers the extent to which officers use force compared to arrests as a whole. There were a total of 36,004 individuals arrested in 2002 and another 36,492 in 2001.²³ Splitting the total number of arrests in 2001 in half to account for the 18-month study period examined here results in 54,250 arrests. Comparing the 962 force cases in the data set that resulted in arrest to the 54,250 individuals arrested shows officers use force in about one of every 56 arrests. Put another way, force is used in less than two percent of arrests (1.8 percent). If only unique individuals are considered (n=802 of the 962 force cases), the figure drops to 1.5 percent.²⁴

²³ Note that arrest numbers are taken directly from the San Antonio Police Department website (<http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapdinfoCrime.asp#arrests>) with year 2001 total number of arrests split in half to account for only six months of force reporting data.

²⁴ Attempts to compare arrests across service areas proved unsuccessful as San Antonio police officials were unable to provide arrest statistics by service area.

Some prior studies have compared the rate of force to arrest incidents. As noted by Worden and Shelagh (2002: p. 94), an examination of six years worth of force reports in Rochester, New York during the 1970s found officers used force in about one of every 52 arrests (about 2% of the time), a rate similar to that uncovered in San Antonio. In a later study, which also examined police use of force reports in Rochester (as well as Syracuse, New York), but in the mid-1980s, found that force was used in about five percent of arrests in Rochester and in four percent of arrests in Syracuse. Conversely, a study in the mid-1980s in St. Paul, Minnesota found a significantly higher percentage of force (14.0%).²⁵ However, a study in Savannah, Georgia in the early 1990s showed a rate of only one percent. In short, some studies have found a rather high percentage of force while others have found a relatively low percentage. One interpretation with studies that found lower rates of force may be the result of officer bias in filling out report forms.²⁶ At the high end it could be the result of counting handcuffing as "use of force." In sum, there appears to be a significant amount of evidence indicating that San Antonio police officers, on the whole, use force sparingly, at least within arrest situations. Nonetheless, the following analyses look more specifically at a series of additional factors in relation to arrests.

For the following analyses San Antonio police officials provided a random sample of 100 arrest cases where officers did not use force - to the extent that required a force report. Two

²⁵ Another study of note was conducted by Garner et al. (1995), which looked at arrests over a two-week period in Phoenix, Arizona finding that officers used force 22 percent of the time - however, the definition of force used seems to include simple restraint or holds, a form of force not considered according to San Antonio force reporting requirements.

²⁶ Adams (1995) provides a detailed discussion of calculating the use and abuse of police force, and the factors that may account for different reporting rates.

methodological issues with respect to this sample requires further clarification. First, as a result of the way arrest data is cataloged, San Antonio officials had difficulty drawing a representative sample of cases with similar types of incidents to that found in the use of force data set from which to compare (i.e., arrest incidents not specifically reported for VCR purposes). As such, the comparable arrest sample was restricted to incidents involving robbery, burglary, assault, larceny, auto theft, drugs, and murder. Second, officials drew the random sample to closely match the location of the incident. That is, a similar proportion of cases were sampled from each of the six service areas as that which was found in the use of force data set. Thus, in the following analysis, location (and by relation extent of crime by location) is controlled for in the sampling strategy.

Turning to the use of force data set, the total number of cases (N=1,066) had to be pared down to offer a comparable match to the 100 arrest cases without force. First, 104 of the 1,066 cases did not involve an arrest, and thus were excluded. Second, the 368 cases that did not involve a robbery, burglary, assault, larceny, auto theft, drugs, or murder were excluded. Third, 21 cases involving an Asian officer or citizen were excluded given that there were no such cases in the comparative arrest sample. This resulted in a total of 573 arrest cases with force.

To compare arrest incidents resulting in force to the sample not resulting in force two types of analysis were conducted. The first involves a series of bivariate examinations between those factors considered in the previous stages (officer and citizen race, sex, etc.) and the force/no force dichotomy (results found in Tables 4.1 through 4.9). The second involves a multivariate analysis, where all factors are considered simultaneously (results found in Tables

4.10 through 4.12).²⁷

Results examining officer race and sex, in relation to force, are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. As seen Table 4.1, White officers were the most likely to use force. For instance, 87.7 percent of the incidents involving White officers resulted in force, compared to 83.4 percent of the incidents involving Hispanic officers and 75.9 percent involving Black officers.²⁸

Nonetheless, the resulting differences were not statistically significant.

Table 4.1 Officer Race by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	Officer Race		
	White n (%)	Hispanic n(%)	Black n (%)
No Force	39 (12.3)	54 (16.6)	7 (24.1)
Force	279 (87.7)	272 (83.4)	22 (75.9)
Total	318 (100.0)	326 (100.0)	29 (100.0)

Chi-Square=4.42, p=.110

With respect to officer sex, Table 4.2 shows that male officers were more likely to use force during arrest incidents. Just over 85 percent of the encounters involving male officers

²⁷ An alternative approach to examining differences between force and no force is to select a random sample of 100 force cases (from the 573 cases) to compare to the random sample of 100 no force cases. While this offers an exact SO/50 split with respect to force/no force cases, the drawback is a loss of information. As such, the results presented are based on the entire usable force data (N=573) compared to the arrest sample resulting in no force (N=100). Nonetheless, an additional analysis was conducted using the alternative approach. With the exception of the officer race (which became statistically significant) and sex (which failed to reach statistical significance) comparisons, the results remained the same for all of the additional bivariate comparisons, as well as the multivariate analysis.

²⁸ While the skewed distribution invariably results in a larger frequency/percentage for force cases, note that the important comparison is found across each category of the factor/measure being analyzed, rather than within (i.e., comparing horizontally, not vertically). In other words, as shown in Table 4.1, the focus is on the comparison between race categories (e.g., 87.7% versus 83.4% and 75.9%), not within race categories (e.g., 87.7% versus 12.3%).

resulted in force compared to 66.7 percent of female officer encounters.

Table 4.2 Officer Sex by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	Officer Sex	
	Male n (%)	Female n (%)
No Force	95 (14.4)	5 (33.3)
Force	563 (85.6)	10 (66.7)
Total	(100.0)	(100.0)

Chi-Square=4.14, p=.042

Turning to officer education, Table 4.3 lists the frequency breakdown for levels of education and the extent of force. As seen, officers with some form of college education were, by far, more likely to rely on force during the police-citizen contact. Of the 64 cases handled by officers with no college, only 2 (3.1 %) resulted in force. Comparatively, 409 of the 423 (96.7%) encounters handled by officers with some college or an Associate's degree used force; and, those with a Bachelor or Master's degree used force in 162 of 186 (87.1 %) incidents.

Table 4.3 Officer Education by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	Officer Education		
	High School or less n (%)	Some College or Associates Degree n (%)	Bachelors Degree or more n (%)
No Force	62 (96.9)	14 (3.3)	24 (12.9)
Force	2 (3.1)	409 (96.7)	162 (87.1)
Total	64 (100.0)	423 (100.0)	186 (100.0)

Chi-Square=385.45, p=.000

In terms of officer experience, Table 4.4 identifies the force/no force distinction according to the number of years on the job. There is little variation found here. In fact, all the groups listed used force in eighty some percent of their encounters. The most likely group involved officers with 6-10 years of experience (n=181, 88.7%), while the least likely were those with 16 or more years of experience (n=40, 80.0%).

Table 4.4 Officer Experience by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	Officer Experience			
	1-5 Years n (%)	6-10 Years n (%)	11-15 Years n (%)	16+ Years n (%)
No Force	55 (15.6)	23 (11.3)	12 (17.9)	10 (20.0)
Force	297 (84.4)	181 (88.7)	55 (82.1)	40 (80.0)
Total	352 (100.0)	204 (100.0)	67 (100.0)	50 (100.0)

Chi-Square=3.77, p=.287

Turning to citizen characteristics, Tables 4.5 through 4.7 list citizen race, sex, and age by force. As seen in Table 4.5, officers relied on force in 86.6 percent of their encounters with Hispanic citizens, compared to 81.9 percent for Whites and 75.9 percent for Blacks. The observed differences, however, did not reach statistical significance. With regard to citizen sex, Table 4.6 shows that officers were more likely to use force on male citizens (85.9%) compared to female citizens (78.9%), although not significantly. In relation to citizen age (Table 4.7), force was somewhat evenly spread. For example, citizens in the highest age bracket (40 and over) were nearly as likely to be involved in a forceful incident as those in the lowest age group (those 17 and under). On the whole, the differences were not statistically significant.

Table 4.5 Citizen Race by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	Citizen Race		
	White n (%)	Hispanic n (%)	Black n (%)
No Force	25 (18.1)	57 (13.4)	18 (24.1)
Force	113 (81.9)	369 (86.6)	91 (75.9)
Total	138 (100.0)	426 (100.0)	109 (100.0)

Chi-Square=2.13, p =.345

Table 4.6 Citizen Sex by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	Citizen Sex	
	Male n (%)	Female n (%)
No Force	85 (14.1)	15 (21.1)
Force	517 (85.9)	56 (78.9)
Total	602 (100.0)	71 (100.0)

Chi-Square=2.46, p =.116

Table 4.7 Citizen Age by Force (N=672*)

Was Force Used?	Citizen Age				
	17< Years n (%)	18-20 Years n (%)	21-29 Years n (%)	30-39 Years n (%)	40+ Years n (%)
No Force	5 (8.6)	23 (21.9)	37 (14.6)	22 (14.2)	13 (12.9)
Force	53 (91.4)	82 (78.1)	216 (85.4)	133 (85.8)	88 (87.1)
Total	58 (100.0)	105 (100.0)	253 (100.0)	155 (100.0)	101 (100.0)

Chi-Square=6.28, p =.179

The final two bivariate comparisons are listed in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, which compare the number of "force" and "total" citizen complaints to force/no force in arrest incidents. Both show a distinct and statistically significant pattern: officers with a higher number of citizen complaints were more likely to rely on force. For instance, as seen in Table 4.9, encounters involving officers with zero complaints led to force 74.4 percent of the time compared to 97.4 percent for those with five or more complaints.

Table 4.8 Force Complaints by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	# of Force Complaints				
	Zero n (%)	One n (%)	Two n (%)	Three n (%)	Four n (%)
No Force	85 (19.6)	14 (9.8)	1 (1.4)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Force	348 (80.4)	129 (90.2)	73 (98.6)	19 (100.0)	4 (100.0)
Total	433 (100.0)	143 (100.0)	74 (100.0)	19 (100.0)	4 (100.0)

Chi-Square=25.38, p=.000

Table 4.9 Total Complaints by Force (N=673)

Was Force Used?	# of Total Complaints					
	Zero n (%)	One n(%)	Two n (%)	Three n (%)	Four n (%)	Five+ n (%)
No Force	51 (25.6)	23 (15.2)	16 (13.2)	6 (6.4)	2 (6.3)	2 (2.6)
Force	148 (74.4)	128 (84.8)	105 (86.5)	68 (93.6)	30 (93.8)	74 (97.4)
Total	199 (100.0)	151 (100.0)	121 (100.0)	94 (100.0)	32 (100.0)	76 (100.0)

Chi-Square=34.71, p = .000

In addition to looking at each individual variable singularly, in relation to force, a multivariate statistical analysis was conducted (in this case a logistic regression model), which examines all the variables (e.g., race, sex, number of complaints, etc.) simultaneously.²⁹ The benefit of such an analysis is beneficial when wanting to determine the effect of each variable while controlling for the effects of all the others. For instance, in the following analysis the effect of citizen race is examined while also accounting for citizen sex and age, as well as officer race, sex, and so forth, within the same individual incident.³⁰

Results are presented in Table 4.10.³¹ The first two columns in Table 4.10 identify the coefficient and SE (i.e., standard error) for each of the variables. These are simply statistical estimates offering no real meaning from an interpretive standpoint. The final column shows the p-level (i.e., significance level). Similar to the Chi-Square test in terms of testing for independence, a p-value of less than .05 is considered statistically significant.

²⁹ Logistic regression is the proper statistical model to be used with a dichotomous outcome variable (i.e., force/no force) (see Long, 1997: pgs. 34-83).

³⁰ The benefit of conducting a multivariate analysis is somewhat limited because of the inability to control for "potentially justifying factors" of why force may or may not have been used (e.g., the presence and level of citizen resistance encountered). For example, while the following findings show that officers with increased levels of education are more likely to use force during the arrest process, such officers (those with more education) may actually face an increased likelihood of citizen resistance. Thus, one would not conclude that education leads to force, but rather that citizen resistance leads to force.

³¹ Please see Appendix at the end of the report for an overview of how variables were coded, as well as descriptive statistics for the dependent and each of the independent variables.

Table 4.10 Logistic Regression Results

Variable	Coefficient	SE	<u>p-Level</u>
<u>Officer Characteristics</u>			
Race			
Hispanic	- .04	.25	.844
Black	- .70	.51	.169
Sex	.60	.62	.331
Education	.78	.13	.000
Experience	- .01	.02	.406
<u>Citizen Characteristics</u>			
Race			
Hispanic	.32	.28	.262
Black	- .01	.37	.981
Sex	.26	.34	.452
Age	.01	.01	.601
<u>Complaints</u>			
Force	.62	.30	.038
Total	.29	.10	.008

N = 672, Pseudo R Square .13, Model Chi-Square 91.38 (p=.000)

Of the variables examined, three show a positive (and statistically significant) relationship to force. Police-citizen encounters involving officers with higher levels of education were more likely to use force during arrests than those with less education. In addition, encounters involving officers with a higher number of complaints were also significantly more likely to use force during arrests. The remaining variables showed no effect (Le., no difference in force usage). For example, officers were no more likely to use force on Hispanic and Black citizens when compared to Whites.³²

³² As a result of being a multinomial categorical variable (more than two categories that cannot be ordinaly or continuously ranked), one of the race categories must be omitted from the analysis so as to serve as the reference category. In this case Whites were omitted and the effect of Hispanics and Blacks were compared against Whites. Two additional models (not shown) were run where Hispanics and Blacks served as the reference category. In each case, race did not reach statistical significance and none of the remaining variable effects were altered.

Stage 5

FORCE AND CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES

It was hoped that the final stage would contain a series of contextual analyses based on situational factors that have been shown to influence the application of police use of force (Garner et al., 1995; Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002; Worden, 1995). More specifically, the intent was to examine four particular measures: how the encounter began (i.e., citizen versus officer initiated), the number of citizen and officer bystanders present during the incident, citizen impairment (e.g., alcohol), and type of problem. However, only data for the latter (i.e., type of problem), are readily captured in the use of force data set.

Table 5.1 presents the frequency breakdown for type of problem. As shown, assaults constitute the most frequent type of problem cited by officers. Just over 40 percent (n=429) of all reports list assault as the type of problem. In addition to assaults, evading/fleeing from officers (n=150, 14.1 %) and problems relating to narcotics (n=124, 11.6%) also occur rather frequently. After these three there is a stark drop off as the next frequently listed problem is larceny at 3.6 percent (n=39). Intuitively, one would expect such problems like assaults, evading/fleeing, and narcotics to prompt an increased likelihood of force. It is less clear as to why other problems would. Of course, this underscores the importance of documenting contextual influences in the future. Any number of potentially valid reasons may exist, not the least of which may be an increased likelihood of citizen resistance. Unfortunately, such information is not available here.

Table 5.1 Type of Problem (N=1,066)

Type of Problem	Number of Reports	Percent
Assault	429	40.2
Evading/Fleeing	150	14.1
Narcotics	124	11.6
Larceny	39	3.6
DWI/Drunk	31	2.9
Wanted/Fugitive	30	2.8
Burglary	21	2.0
Disorderly Conduct	21	2.0
Weapons	17	1.6
Criminal Mischief	16	1.5
Disturbance	15	1.4
Information	14	1.3
Robbery	14	1.3
Trespassing	13	1.2
Auto Theft	12	1.1
Escape	11	1.0
Other (not labeled)	9	.9
Injured Person	8	.8
Failure to ill	8	.8
Sudden Death	8	.8
Family	7	.7
Retaliation	7	.7
Fight	5	.5
Accident	5	.5

Type of Problem	Number of Reports	Percent
Ordinance Violation	4	.4
Reckless Driving	4	.4
Fraud	2	.2
Lewdness	2	.2
Attack with Weapon	2	.2
Assist Public	2	.2
Suicide	2	.2
Suspicious Person	1	.1
Prostitution	1	.1
Stalking	1	.1
Burglary Alarm	1	.1
Fail to Stop/ID	1	.1
Misc. (not labeled)	29	2.7
Total	1066	100.0

While most of the original indicators of interest are not captured in the data, several additional pieces of information are available. The first is citizen injury. Of the 883 unique citizens listed, 280 (31.7%) sustained an injury. The extent of these injuries are unknown though, as is information pertaining to the presence and extent of officers injuries.

The force data set also captures some limited information of assisting officers. As noted at the outset of this report, most force incidents involved assisting officers. Analysis conducted in Stage 1 involving individual officers showed that some officers account for a disproportionate number of force reports. When a similar type of analysis was conducted for backup officers a

much more evenly disbursed distribution was uncovered. In fact, only two of the 520 total officers were reported as assisting officers in more than 5 incidents.

Finally, a review of the supervisor information revealed several insights. First, as would be expected given the distribution of supervisory personnel, most supervisors listed in the data set were White and male. Of the 159 unique supervisors, 89 (56.0%) were White and 148 (93.1 %) were male. Second, supervisors show up to the scene of a reported force incident 56.5 percent (n=483) of the time (of the total number of unique incidents, n=855). Third, supervisors only identify three incidents in which the officer did not follow proper policy and procedure a figure that computes to less than one-half of one-percent (0.4).³³ Additionally, of the three reports labeled as not following proper policy and procedures, none list a recommendation from the supervisor.

³³ Another five reports were labeled as unknown by the supervisor.

Type of Problem	Number of Reports	Percent.
Ordinance Violation	4	.4
Reckless Driving	4	.4
Fraud	2	.2
Lewdness	2	.2
Attack with Weapon	2	.2
Assist Public	2	.2
Suicide	2	.2
Suspicious Person	1	.1
Prostitution	1	.1
Stalking	1	.1
Burglary Alann	1	.1
Fail to StopIID	1	.1
Misc. (not labeled)	29	2.7
Total	1066	100.0

While most of the original indicators of interest are not captured in the data, several additional pieces of information are available. The first is citizen injury. Of the 883 unique citizens listed, 280 (31.7%) sustained an injury. The extent of these injuries are unknown though, as is information pertaining to the presence and extent of officers injuries.

The force data-set also captures some limited information on assisting officers. As noted at the outset of this report, most force incidents involved assisting officers. Analysis conducted in Stage 1 involving individual officers showed that some officers account for a disproportionate number of force reports. When a similar type of analysis was conducted for backup officers a

- 22.9 percent of the officers in the use of force database account for 52.3 percent of the total number of reports, while 77.1 percent of the officers account for 47.7 percent of the total number of reports.

B. Officer Characteristics

- White officers account for the most reports with 52.3 percent of the total, followed by Hispanics (42.3%), Blacks (2.9%) and Asians (2.5%); comparatively, White officers make up 49.2 percent of the department, Hispanics 44.5 percent, Blacks 5.7 percent, and Asians 0.6 percent.
- Male officers account for 98.4 percent of the reports filed.
- Officers with some college but no degree represent the largest percentage of force reports (58.8%), followed by those with a Bachelor's degree (27.8%) and Associate's degree (12.2%).
- Officers with the least amount of experience account for the largest percentage of force usage. Officers with five or less years of experience account for nearly half (48.9%) of the total reports; when officers with 10 or less years of experience are considered the percentage increases to roughly 80 percent.
- 48 different units are represented in the force database. Of these, half filed 10 or less reports, while half filed more than 10. The top two units represented are Central and West Patrol dogwatch, accounting for nearly a quarter of the total number of reports (23.3%). When assignment is aggregated into service areas, the Central and West, as a whole, account for about half of all reports (49.1 %).
- The rate of force per 10,000 calls for service is markedly higher in the Central Service area (17.45) compared to each of the remaining five service areas throughout the city: South (10.05), West (9.98), East (7.37), North (4.57%), and Northwest (3.06%).
- Most reports are filed by officers assigned the dogwatch shift (47.3%).

C. Citizen Characteristics

- Hispanics account for the greatest number of reports at 64.9 percent, followed by Whites (19.4%), Blacks (15.1 %), and Asians (0.6); comparatively, Hispanics account for 59.5 percent of the population, Whites 32.3 percent, Blacks 6.6 percent, and Asians 1.5 percent.

- 9 out of 10 (90.6%) force reports involve male citizens.
- The largest age group represented involves those citizens in their 20's (34.1 %), followed by those under 20 (24.4%).

D. Officer/Citizen Characteristics

- While officers of all races are most likely to use force on Hispanic citizens, officers tend to use force more readily within race (e.g., White officer/White Citizen).
- When the percentage of force is compared to the percentage of the population within each of the six service areas, Blacks are over-represented in each area, while Whites and Hispanics are generally under-represented; the key exception being the overrepresentation of Hispanics in the Northwest.
- Little variation exists across officer education levels by citizen race.

E. Higher/Lower Force Officer Comparisons

- When comparing officers who report force more frequently (five or more reports) to those reporting force less frequently (less than five reports), few differences are found in relation to officer race, sex, and education, as well as citizen sex and age.
- Differences are more pronounced in terms of officer experience, assigned unit and shift, and citizen race. Officers in the higher force group are more likely to be young, assigned to the Central or West, and work the night shift. Further, officers in the higher force group, compared to those in the lower force group, are more likely to use force in encounters involving Hispanic citizens compared to other races.

Stage 2 - Force and Location

- Officers are more likely to use force in areas of higher violent crime.
- When districts with 18 or more force reports are compared to those with less than 18, the average number of violent crimes is 500 compared to 438 (a 14.2% difference).

Stage 3 - Force and Citizen Complaints

- When officers with 10 or more force reports are compared to those with less than 10, the average number of "force" complaints per officer is 1.20 versus .43 .
- When officers with 10 or more force reports are compared to those with less than 10, the average number of "total" complaints per officer is 3.60 versus 1.67.
- When officers with 5 or more force reports are compared to those with less than 5, the average number of "force" complaints per officer is .74 versus .41.
- ° When officers with 5 or more force reports are compared to those with less than 5, the average number of "force" complaints per officer is 2.53 versus 1.61.

Stage 4 - Force and Arrest

- Officers use force in about one of every 56 arrests (or 1.8% of all arrests).
- When arrest cases resulting in force are compared to arrest cases where no force is used, officers with higher levels of education, and those with more citizen complaints were more like to use force.

Stage 5 - Force and Contextual Influences

- The most frequently cited problem listed by officers are assaults (40.2%), evading/fleeing (14.1 %), and narcotics (11.6%), with larceny a distant fourth (3.6%).
- Of the 883 unique citizens listed in the force data set, 31.7 percent sustained an injury.
- While nearly 9 of 10 reports document an assisting officer, only 2 officers served in this role in more than five incidents.
- Supervisors showed up to the scene of a reported force incident 56.5 percent of the time.
- Supervisors identified three incidents (0.4%) in which the officer did not follow proper policy and procedure; of these, none list a recommendation for action.

Discussion

Many of the findings uncovered are encouraging. The available evidence indicates, on the whole, that San Antonio police officers use force rather sparingly. When compared to the total number of calls for service, officers use force in about one of every 1,033 contacts (one-tenth of one-percent). When compared to the total number of arrests, officers use force in about one of every 56 arrests (1.8%). Regardless of the measuring stick, the extent of force used is not uncommon, and arguably fairly low. Additionally, it does not appear that officers rely on higher forms of force at an uncommonly high rate. For example, much of the force used involves the hands or other body parts as opposed to the use of intermediate weapons or potentially deadly force.

There are other encouraging findings as well. Many of the analyses in which various officer and citizens characteristics are examined showed no effect. For instance, when comparing officers who use force most frequently (more than five reports filed) to those using force least frequently (less than five reports), few differences are found in relation to officer race, sex, and education, as well as citizen sex and age (e.g., White officers in the higher force group use force similarly to those in the lower force group; officers in both groups use force similarly when encountering male citizens). Moreover, when arrest cases resulting in force are compared to arrest cases where no force is used, few differences across officer and citizens characteristics are discovered (e.g., officers are no more likely to use force in encounters with Hispanic or Black citizens than they are Whites). Finally, on average, officers report using force more frequently in the most violent districts of the city.

While there are many positives to be taken from this inquiry, there are instances that raise

some degree of concern. For example, a relatively small proportion of the officers account for a relatively large number of force reports. On the face of it, this is neither surprising (previous studies show similar disparity in force usage) nor cause for alarm (particularly in light of no measure indicating whether such high rate officers are encountering high rate resistance), but can be quite disconcerting from a public perception viewpoint. Additionally, several other measures showed disparate effects, which prompt some concern, but generally have been found in other studies as well (e.g., less experienced officers are more likely to report force).

There are several areas of greater concern. First, when comparing percentages of force usage to the total population, Hispanics and Blacks are over-represented in the force data set. When individual service areas are considered, pronounced differences are uncovered with respect to Blacks being over-represented in each area. Conversely, Whites and Hispanics are generally under-represented with the exception of Hispanics being over-represented in the Northwest. Of course, it is impossible to put such findings into context. Without documenting the frequency or level of citizen resistance one does not know whether such disparity can be attributed to differences in citizen behavior or the result of race itself.

Second, two areas (Central and West) account for nearly half of all reported force. While the rate of force in these areas is still rather infrequent, one has to ask why such a larger percentage of all force reporting occurs in these areas? Are officers working these areas encountering that much more citizen resistance prompting such disparity in force usage? Without officers documenting the frequency or level of citizen resistance on the use of force report forms these questions remain answered. Alternatively, it is possible that officers in other areas (i.e., North, East, South, Prue) are under-reporting their force usage, and that officers in the

Central and West are not using force more often. If this were the case, the issue is management oriented as opposed to the documentation of resistance. Additionally, the rate of force in the Central, in relation to calls for service, is substantially higher than any of the other service areas in the city.

Third, when comparing higher force reporting officers to lower reporting officers (Stage 1, section E), several significant differences were found. For example, higher force reporting officers are significantly more likely to be young, work the Central and West areas (particularly the Central), and be assigned the night shift. Further, the most frequent force users were more likely to use force during encounters with Hispanic citizens.

Fourth, one of the most consistent findings throughout this study is that officers involved in more force incidents are also more likely to have a higher number of citizen complaints. This raises the concern that officers relying on force more readily are also using force inappropriately. It is one thing for an officer to use force, but another if such force is not delivered properly. In this sense, high rate officers may actually be problem officers. On the other hand, the more one uses force the more opportunities one has to receive a complaint. The surest way not to receive a complaint is to do little or no police work; or, to avoid probing or dealing with situations where conflict is likely (e.g., chasing drug dealers). In this sense, high rate officers may actually be productive officers.

Fifth, in some analyses officers with more education are more likely to report force. Although such a finding is not without precedent (see Worden, 1995: p. 54), it runs counter to a more substantial body of evidence showing that increased education generally leads to less force (see Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002: pg. 238). Of course, finding that officers with increased levels

of education are more likely to use force can partially be explained if there are simply more educated officers in the department or assigned to duties more likely to offer force opportunities (e.g., patrol). However, as with comparisons of citizen complaints, this would not explain all the findings, especially when percentages are computed (e.g., in Stage 4), which effectively would serve to standardize and account for a disproportional number of educated officers.

Finally, there is a considerable degree of concern with respect to two supervisory issues. First, supervisors only show up to the scene of a force incident just over half the time. While there is nothing inherently wrong with this, one might be concerned with the degree of accountability in place, as well as with the public perception it may create. Second, and more pressing, is that supervisors only list three instances where the officer using force did not follow proper policy and procedure. While one cannot state that this figure is incorrect, it computes to a very low percentage (.28% of all force reports, .006 of all arrests, .0002% of all police-citizen contacts), at least compared to the limited amount of research that has examined improper force (see Worden and Shelagh, 2002: p. 95).

Future Efforts

In this final section a series of recommendations are offered for both future data collection and analyses.

1. First, officials should consider altering the current use of force form to capture several key pieces of information regarding citizen behaviors. Legal justification for the use of force is most notably found when suspects are resistant, there is a threat to citizen or officer safety, and in the course of making an arrest. The latter justification is already captured, but there is no mechanism to readily capture a) whether a suspect resists, and if so, to what extent (passively, verbally, physically); b) if citizens at the scene pose a threat to one another requiring physical intervention on the part of the police; or c) whether the citizen has a weapon, even if not actively threatening anyone, that may prompt an officer to proactively use force as a preventive tactic.

In addition to these three key pieces of information it is also recommended that several additional situational factors be captured including: citizen impairment (mental, alcohol/drugs), whether the encounter was officer or citizen-initiated, and the number of citizen and officer bystanders present. Each of these factors has been linked to force usage. Examining force data within this context is crucial if one wants to adequately, and in a non-bias manner, look at how officers apply force in day-to-day encounters with the public. Failure to account for citizen

behaviors and situational factors fails to properly depict why force was used in any particular incident.

2. Officials should consider adopting supervisor's control of persons' reports as opposed to the current officer use of force reports. As noted in a recent *Police Quarterly* article (see Terrill et al., 2003a), this form of force reporting generally requires a supervisor to travel to the scene of all incidents (or at least a representative sample) when officers use force to interview the officers, suspects, and witnesses, and record their responses.³⁴ Similar to officer completed use of force reports, these forms can combine pre-selected categories for demographics, level and type of force, resistance, weapons, and other information. For example, the Miami-Dade (Florida) Supervisor's Report of Use of Force to Control includes blocks of information on the suspect's race, injury, treatment, impairment, observed behavior, weapons present and used, and level of resistance. Similarly, information on the officer(s) includes a reference to his or her personal data (e.g., race, gender), as well as behavioral information consisting of the level and type of force and weapon used. The information presented on the form is supplemented by a detailed narrative explaining each of the parties' perspectives. That is, the supervisor writes a sequential account of all relevant actions: the original call or observation, the officer's and suspect's behavior, why the suspect resisted, and the level and type of resistance. Similarly, the officer's actions including the level of force and how it was used is documented. Information on any injury, complaint of injury, and treatment is also included. The supervisor then records the

³⁴ Research shows this approach to recoding force yields a lower incidence rate, perhaps a result of more accountability, perhaps due to a greater degree of under-reporting (see Alpert and MacDonald, 2001: p. 407).

sequential ordering of who did what to whom, why, and the result.

This comprehensive type of report requires that supervisors ask officers, suspects, and witnesses a series of questions and record their responses. It is critical for the supervisor to understand that her or his job is to capture the stories provided by the parties, not to justify the officer's actions or to argue with the suspect. This approach provides a panoramic picture of the use of force, levels, environmental factors, suspect resistance, and any other possible contributing factors (see Terrill et al., 2003a for much more detail on this approach).

3. Should the department decide to stay with the current practice of officer use of force reporting, consideration should be given to two supervisory issues. First, officials should actively encourage (or mandate) supervisors to show up to the scene of force incidents. Results from Stage 5 show that supervisors only show up to the scene of force incidents about 56 percent of the time. As noted in the last recommendation (see footnote 33), an enhanced supervisory presence may create more accountability, which may in turn decrease force usage. Second, also as noted in Stage 5, in only three cases did a supervisor conclude that the involved officer failed to follow policy. While this may in fact be an accurate reflection, the rate is so low that, fairly or unfairly, it has the potential to raise public suspicion. It is unknown, based on the current use of force data set, how much effort supervisors put into attempting to determine whether "proper policy and procedure" was followed. To what extent do supervisors seek information from sources other than the officer? From victims, witnesses? If this does not occur regularly, it is recommended that it be part of making a determination on whether the force used was in line with policy and procedure.

4. Regardless of the data collection method used (e.g., officer use of force reports, supervisor control reports), it is recommended that reports be completed when a suspect physically resists, regardless of whether or not the officer responds with force. As currently designed, the only thing known is when officers use force. What is unknown is how often officers are faced with resistant citizens and do not respond in kind. Recent research in two cities shows that this occurs quite frequently (see Terrill, 2001: p. 178). In essence, at the present, the department only has the ability to determine, for lack of a better word, officer failures (i.e., instances when officers are unable to control citizens without using force). Documenting occurrences of citizen resistance would permit a greater understanding of officer successes (i.e., instances when officers are able to control citizens without using force, or a level that is less than the resistance faced).

5. While current policy on police use of force (San Antonio Police Department, Procedure 501) is readily understandable, officials should consider incorporating a use of force continuum within the policy, which would specify varying levels of resistance and equivalent force responses.³⁵ Although such an approach is stated in general terms presently, it is overly broad and fails to specifically link varying levels of resistance to varying levels of force. Altering the policy in this way may permit greater clarity for officers in terms of the appropriate force levels given the level of resistance encountered, as well as offer easier review.³⁶ Numerous force continuum guidelines

³⁵ If each of the first four recommendations were adopted, the department would be in a strong position to adopt the "force factor" strategy suggested in Terrill et al., 2003a. While this process is fairly complex, may be difficult to implement, and involves a substantial resource commitment, the potential benefits may be great (e.g., improved police-citizen relations, reduction in civil lawsuits). Nonetheless, by no means is such an approach required to adequately track force and/or resistance.

³⁶ It is recommended that physical force (currently just labeled "hands") be split into at least two categories: pain compliance and striking/punching. The present classification is overly broad and provides little insight into the

exist and officials are encouraged to contact other departments employing such an approach. Finally, any changes in policy need to be linked back to training methods. According to the current San Antonio Police Department Training Academy Instructor Lesson Plan on the use of force (revised 12/6/02) officers are not specifically trained on a force continuum approach in relation to specific forms of resistance. Similar to the present policy, while noting a continuum approach, the training appears overly broad and fails to *specifically* link varying levels of resistance to varying levels of force.

6. It is important to recognize use of force reports as only one of many mechanisms that should be used when analyzing force usage in the department. In almost no instance should force reports be used alone when attempting to determine the nature and scope of force being used by officers. As demonstrated in this report, two additional data sources, citizen complaints and arrests, are critical data sources that should be used in connection with force reports (as are calls for service). As a result, the department should consider a system that would allow for easier integration between data sources. At the present, integrating these sources of information is at best inefficient (e.g., linking officers educational backgrounds), and at worse ineffective (inability to access comparable arrest data). In short, a relational data base that can access multiple data sources and more readily compare individuals and groups of officers, as well as account for citizen complaints and arrests (not leading to force), would greatly facilitate the ability to not only track force, but the ability to then use this information.

severity of force (e.g., a wristlock and bar arm control is generally less forceful than striking to the face with fists).

7. There are two minor recommendations with respect to ensuring information on the force form is translated to the data set. First, while the current form captures whether the officer was injured, a field signifying this information is missing from the data. Second, a narrative description should be given on each form and this information should be translated to the data set to permit qualitative analysis. For instance, over half of the reports currently have nothing listed in the narrative field of the data set, while most of the remaining reports only describe the extent of citizen and officer injuries or make a notation to "see prisoner's information and transportation record." What is needed is a time sequenced description of the events that led to force/resistance and the circumstances of the actual act(s) itself.

8. While most of the recommendations deal with future data collection and analyses, officials should consider "why" some of the disparities that were uncovered in this report exist. While explanations can only be anecdotal in nature, it is nonetheless an important exercise to consider. For example, in numerous cases officers were more likely to use force during encounters with Hispanic citizens, and especially Blacks, when compared to Whites. One cannot know if this disparity is related to race itself or citizen behavior since no measure of the latter was documented. Nonetheless, the issue remains. Presently, cadets receive 12 hours of training on Multi-Culturism and 14 hours on Interpersonal Spanish; officers receive four hours bi-annually. While it appears the quantity of such training is sufficient, officials should evaluate the content and quality of such training.

Second, it is worth considering the extent to which the frequency of force is clustered in some areas (e.g., Central, West), particularly on the night shift. While the word "culture" is used

hesitantly (there is no definitive consensus on what exactly "culture" is with respect to "police culture"), one may exist whereby force is simply seen as a more acceptable means to policing the population (of course this does not necessarily translate to improper force). While no attitudinal measures exist in the present study, new research shows that officers who buy into traditional culture attitudes (strong law enforcement role orientation, view aggressive patrol tactics positively, has support of supervisor) are more likely to rely on forceful means (see Terrill et al., 2003b). In short, when possible, officials may want to consider re-assignments of some personnel so as to break up the clustering in favor of more dispersion. Prior to this, however, officials should attempt to ensure that officers in the Central and West truly are using force more readily. As previously noted, perhaps officers in other areas are under-reporting force usage. Officials should at least discuss this potential with first-line supervisors from each of the service areas.

Third, in some instances (i.e., arrests), it was found that officers with more education rely on force more often. In many ways this is a perplexing finding. Education is generally viewed as offering greater skills (e.g., analytic and verbal) so as to reduce reliance on force. Officials should research any possible reasons for why these officers are more likely to resort to force. For instance, perhaps these officers are more likely to be assigned duties with an increased risk of conflict.

Fourth, on average, there was a direct connection between the number of reports filed and the number of citizen complaints received. As noted in the previous summary section, this in itself does not necessarily mean that such officers are using force inappropriately, but it does raise this concern. As officials are surely aware, there is a fine line between aggressive policing

tactics and inappropriate policing tactics. Some officers may be having difficulty discerning the two. As such, remedial training may be warranted, although simple strategies such as informal supervisor meetings once a month may be beneficial.

Finally, in numerous cities (e.g., New Orleans, Minneapolis, Miami-Dade), the implementation of an early warning system has led to a reduction in both force usage and citizen complaints (for further detail on early warning systems see Walker et al., 2001). While San Antonio currently employs an early warning system (General Manual, Procedure 306), officials should consider contacting these cities (even if this was done prior to the creation of the early warning system) to discuss the various approaches taken, how San Antonio's system is similar and or different, and the extent to which the systems (including San Antonio's) have been evaluated for effectiveness. For instance, the city's current system involves three methods of selection for inclusion into the program: referral by the chief of police, referral by supervisors, and computer generated based on citizen complaints. Perhaps a fourth selection criteria, based on force reports, should be considered as well. At a minimum, there should be some discussion as to how force reports are, or should be, considered as part a broader early warning system.

Bibliography

- Adams, Kenneth. 1995. "Measuring the prevalence of police abuse of force." Pp. 61-98 in *An Justice for All: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force*, edited by William A. Geller and Hans Toch. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Alpert, Geoffrey P. and John M. MacDonald. 2001. "Police Use of Force: An Analysis of Organizational Influences." *Justice Quarterly* 18 (2): 393-410.
- Fox, James Alan, Jack Levin, and Michael Shively. 1999. *Elementary Statistics in Criminal Justice Research*. New York: Longman Publishing.
- Garner, Joel, Thomas Schade, John Hepburn, and John Buchanan. 1995. "Measuring the Continuum of Force Used by and Against the Police." *Criminal Justice Review* 20 (2): 146-168.
- International Association of Chiefs of Police. 2001. *Police Use of Force in America*. (<http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfslPublicationsI2001useofforce.pdf>).
- Loether, Herman J. and Donald G. McTavish. 1993. *Descriptive and Inferential Statistics: An Introduction*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Long, J. Scott. 1997. *Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- National Institute of Justice (and Bureau of Justice Statistics). 1999. *Use of Force by Police: Overview of National and Local Data*.
- Terrill, William. 2003. "Police Use of Force and Suspect Resistance: The Micro-Process of the Police-Suspect Encounter." *Police Quarterly* 6 (1): 51-83.
- Terrill, William. 2001. *Police Coercion: Application of the Force Continuum*. New York: LFB Publishing.

- Terrill, William and Michael Reisig. 2003. "Neighborhood Context and Police Use of Force." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 40 (3): 291-321.
- Terrill, William, Geoffrey P. Alpert, Roger D. Dunham, and Michael R. Smith. 2003a. "A Management Tool for Evaluating Police Use of Force: An Application of the Force Factor." *Police Quarterly* 6 (2): 150-171.
- Terrill, William; Paoline, Eugene ill; and Peter K. Manning. 2003b. "Police Culture and Coercion." *Criminology*, forthcoming November.
- Terrill, William and Stephen D. Mastrofski. 2002. "Situational and Officer Based Determinants of Police Coercion." *Justice Quarterly* 19: 101-134.
- Terrill, William and John McCluskey. 2002. "Citizen Complaints and Problem Officers: Examining Officer Behavior." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 30 (2): 143-155.
- San Antonio Police Department, Form 62, Use of Force (August, 2001).
- San Antonio Police Department, General Manuel, Procedure 306, Early Warning System.
- San Antonio Police Department, Procedure 501, Use of Force (effective March 5, 2001).
- San Antonio Police Department, Training Academy Instructor Lesson Plan on the use of force (revised 12/6/02)
- Slovak, Jeffrey. 1986. *Styles of Urban Policing*. New York: New York University Press.
- Smith, Douglas A. 1986. "The Neighborhood Context of Police Behavior." Pp. 313-341 in *Communities and Crime*, edited by Albert J. Reiss Jr. and Michael Tonry. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Walker, Samuel, Geoffrey P. Alpert, and Dennis Kenney. 2001. "Early Warning Systems: Responding to the Problem Officer." National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief: NCJ 188565.
- Worden, Robert E. 1995. "The 'Causes' of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence On Police Use of Force." Pp. 31-60 in *An Justice for All: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force*, edited by William A. Geller and Hans Toch. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Worden, Robert E. and Shelagh E. Catlin. 2002. "The Use and Abuse of Force by Police." Pp. 85-120 in *Policing and Misconduct*, edited by Kim M. Lersch. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Glossary

ASP - A brand name police baton; considered an intermediate weapon by the San Antonio Police Department.

Bivariate - Comparing two variables.

Chi Square - A non-parametric test of significance that compares observed frequencies to expected frequencies, whereby "p" is the probability factor that there is a deviation from the expected result. A result of $p < .05$ (considered the conventional standard for this test) indicates a statistically significant difference.

Districts (see also Service Area) - The San Antonio Police Department identifies 113 districts located throughout the city (see Appendix for map view).

Service Areas	Districts
Central	2110,2120,2130,2140,2150,2160,2210,2220,2230,2240,2250,2260,2270,2280,2310,2320,2330,2340,2350,2360,2370,2380
West	5110,5120,5130,5140,5150,5160,5170,5180,5210,5220,5230,5240,5250,5260,5270,5280,5310,5320,5330,5340,5350,5360
Northwest (Prue)	7110,7120,7130,7140,7150,7160,7170,7180,7190,7210,7220,7230,7240,7250,7260,7270,7280,7290,7310,7320,7330,7340
North	3110,3120,3130,3140,3150,3160,3170,3210,3220,3230,3240,3250,3260,3310,3320,3330,3340,3350,3360
East	4110,4120,4130,4140,4150,4160,4170,4180,4210,4220,4230,4240,4250,4260
South	6110,6120,6130,6140,6150,6160,6170,6210,6220,6230,6240,6250,6260,6270

Dyad - A mathematical term indicating a pair or the pairing of items.

Expedited Calls - According to SAPD officials, these include: offense reports and service calls taken over the telephone by Call-takers (Expeditors), in order to enable Field Officers to be utilized more effectively and efficiently. Only selected types of calls can be handled by an Expeditor; in general, these include calls that do not require an officer at the scene, such as property crimes that have already occurred (offense is not in progress, no suspect in the area, no witnesses to the crime, no need for on-scene investigation), as well as calls such as telephone harassment, lost property, and violation of a protective order (when violation is past and officer is not needed at scene).

Logistic Regression - predicting the value of a dependent variable that varies from 0 to 1.

Multivariate - Comparing more than two variables.

N or n - Statistical designation for the number of cases being discussed or analyzed. A large N signifies the inclusion of an entire population or universe of cases; a small n signifies a subgroup of the population or universe of cases.

OC or OC Spray - Oleoresin Capsicum Spray, a type of "pepper" spray; considered an intermediate weapon by the San Antonio Police Department.

Patrol Shifts and Designations - SAPD divides patrol shifts into three 8-hour periods, and designates them as Day or "A Shift" (0630-1430), Evening or "B Shift" (1430-2230) and Dogwatch or "C Shift" (2230-0630). These are indicated through designations such as "CPB" (Central Patrol, B Shift), or "PPC" (prue Patrol, C Shift).

Pearson's - A correlation coefficient for interval level data. Values range from -1.0 to 1.0, where -1.0 is a perfect negative (inverse) correlation, 0.0 is no correlation (i.e., no relationship), and 1.0 is a perfect positive correlation.

Quartile - A statistical term to describe three points that divide an ordered distribution into four parts each containing one quarter of the scores.

Race - Race designations can vary from data set to data set. For the purposes of this report and within the context of the SAPD data set, the following is a break down of race categories and their assigned equivalents.

Race Equivalent	Use of Force Report
Asian	O
Black	AA
Hispanic	H
White	W

Service Areas - The San Antonio Police Department has six service area or substations. These areas break up the jurisdiction into more manageable areas and contain individual patrol stations with assigned personnel. The service areas are known as - Central, West, Northwest (a.k.a. Prue), North, East and South. Each service area is consequently broken down into smaller geographic areas known as districts.

Specialized Unit - Any unit in the SAPD that is not a shift patrol assigned officer.

Use of Force Continuum - A standard force continuum ordinarily ranks varying levels of force and resistance along a continuum in terms of severity, with the explicit purpose of offering officers guidance on how to respond to specific forms of resistance.

Watch - Same as a police shift, a period of time that an officer will work.

Appendix

Table 1.5a Officer Race by Number of Force Reports - Unique Officers (N=520)

Race	Number of Reports	Percent
White	258	49.6
Hispanic	233	44.8
Black	14	2.7
Asian	15	2.9
Total	520	100.0

Table 1.6a Officer Sex by Number of Force Reports - Unique Officers (N=520)

Sex	Number of Reports	Percent
Male	508	97.7
Female	12	2.3
Total	1066	100.0

Table 1.7a Officer Education by Number of Force Reports - Unique Officers (N=520)

Education Level	Number of Reports	Percent
High School or Less	4	.8
Some College	309	59.4
Associates Degree	70	13.5
Bachelors Degree	131	25.2
Masters Degree	6	1.2
Total	520	25.2

Table I.Sa Officer Years on the Job
by Number of Force Reports – Unique Officers (N=520)

Years on Job	Number of Reports	Percent
1	91	17.5
2	40	7.7
3	29	5.6
4	31	6.0
5	37	7.1
<i>Sum total 1-5</i>	228	43.8
6	34	6.5
7	54	10.4
8	34	6.5
9	21	4.0
10	12	2.3
<i>Sum total 6-10</i>	125	29.7
11	9	1.7
12	20	3.8
13	20	3.8
14	14	2.7
15	9	1.7
<i>Sum total 11-15</i>	72	13.7
16	12	2.3
17	6	1.2
18	4	.8
19	8	1.5
20	5	1.0
<i>Sum total 16-20</i>	35	6.8

Years on Job	Number of Reports	Percent
21	3	.6
22	2	.4
23	1	.2
24	1	.2
25	4	.8
<i>Sum total 21-25</i>	11	2.2
26	1	.2
27	3	.6
28	6	1.2
29	3	.6
30	1	.2
<i>Sum total 26-30</i>	14	2.8
31	2	.4
32	2	.4
33	1	.2
<i>Sum total 31-33</i>	4	1.0
Overall Total	520	100.0

Table 1.12a Citizen Race by Number of Force Reports - Unique Suspects (N=880)*

Race	Number of Reports	Percent
Hispanic	562	63.9
White	178	20.2
Black	135	15.3
Asian	5	.6
Total	880	100.0

*citizen race information missing on 3 reports.

1.13a Citizen Race by Types of Force - Unique Suspects (N=880)

Type of Force*	Citizen Race				p-Level
	Hispanic n (%)	White n (%)	Black n (%)	Asian n (%)	
Hands	444 (79.0)	134 (75.3)	109 (80.7)	3 (60.0)	.461
ASP	36 (6.4)	14 (7.9)	16 (11.9)	0 (0.0)	.165
OC Spray	56 (10.0)	19 (10.7)	21 (15.6)	0 (0.0)	.247
Firearm	38 (6.8)	20 (11.2)	7 (5.2)	2 (40.0)	.006
Other	83 (14.8)	25 (14.0)	9 (6.7)	0 (0.0)	.070

*Note: figures do not sum to designated totals by race category (i.e., Hispanic, n=562; White, n=178; Black, n=135) due to multiple types of force used in some incidents.

Table 1.14a Citizen Sex by Number of Force Reports - Unique Suspects (N=880)*

Sex	Number of Reports	Percent
Male	792	90.0
Female	88	10.0
Total	880	100.0

*citizen sex information missing on 3 reports.

Table 1.15a Citizen Age by Number of Force Reports - Unique Suspects (N=872)*

Ethnicity	Number of Reports	Percent
17 and under	97	11.1
18- 20	117	13.4
21-29	297	34.1
30-39	210	24.1
40-49	121	13.9
50-59	24	2.8
60 and over	6	.7
Total	872	100.0

*citizen age information missing on 11 reports.

Table 2.2a Number of District Force Reports by
Mean Number of Crimes per District (N=1,022)

Districts by # of Force Reports	Mean #:		
	Part I and II Crimes per District	Part I - All Crimes per District	Part I - Violent Crimes per District
Districts with 18 or more Force Reports	2296	1679	508
Districts with less than 18 Force Reports	2184	1668	477

Table 3.1a Number of Force Reports by
Mean Number of Citizen Complaints per Officer (N=1,066)

<u>Officers by # of Force Reports</u>	Average # of "Force" Complaints per Officer	Average # of "Total" Complaints per Officer
<u>Officers with 10+ Force Reports</u>	1.30	3.52
<u>Officers with <10 Force Reports</u>	.55	1.96
<u>Officers with 5+ Force Reports</u>	.87	2.78
<u>Officers with 5+ Force Reports</u>	.48	1.76


Logistic Regression Model Independent Variable Descriptions

Variable	Definition
<u>Officer Characteristics</u>	
Race	
White	1=White, 0=Non- White
Hispanic	1=Hispanic, 0=Non-Hispanic
Black	1=Black, 0=Non-Black
Sex	1=Male,0=Female
Education	1=Less than H.S., 2=H.S., 3=Some college, 4=Associates, 5=Bachelors, 6=Masters
Experience	Years on the job
<u>Citizen Characteristics</u>	
Race	
White	1 = White, 0=Non-White
Hispanic	1 = Hispanic, 0=Non-Hispanic
Black	1 = Black, 0=Non-Black
Sex	1 = Male,0=Female
Age	Years old
<u>Complaints</u>	
Force Total	# of citizen complaints for force Total # of citizen complaints


Logistic Regression Model Descriptive Statistics (N=673)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std. Dev.</u>
<u>Dependent</u>			
Force	0-1	.85	.35
<u>Officer Characteristics</u>			
<u>Race</u>			
White	0-1	.47	.50
Hispanic	0-1	.04	.20
Black	0-1	.48	.50
Sex	0-1	.98	.14
Education	1-6	3.59	1.00
Experience	1-32	6.44	5.76
<u>Citizen Characteristics</u>			
<u>Race</u>			
White	0-1	.21	.40
Hispanic	0-1	.63	.48
Black	0-1	.16	.36
Sex	0-1	.89	.31
Age	12-72	29.07	10.22
<u>Complaints</u>			
Force	0-4	.54	.84
Total	0-14	2.00	2.37


City View




Central Substation



East Substation





West Substation

Addendum

Stage 3, page 45, endnote 18, last sentence reads:

Officials report that a total of 20 force complaints were received during the 18-month study period.

Change to:

Officials report that a total of 90 force complaints were received during the 18-month study period.

San Antonio Police Department

“USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS” BY DR. W. TERRILL

SAPD RESPONSE

November 06, 2003

Background:

The Use of Force by law enforcement officers is regulated by Federal and State laws, as well as by individual department policy.

Title 18, U.S.C. (the Civil Rights Code), Section 242: “Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law” says:

“Law enforcement officers are allowed to utilize whatever force is “reasonably” necessary.” “Violations of federal law occur where it can be shown that the force used was willfully “unreasonable” or “excessive” against individuals.”

The Texas **Penal Code**, in Chapter 9, Subchapter E, says:

“A peace officer is justified in using force when and to the degree that the officer reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest.”

The Texas **Code of Criminal Procedure**, 15.24, says:

“In making an arrest, all reasonable means are permitted to be used to effect it. No greater force, however, shall be resorted to than is necessary to secure the arrest and detention of the accused.”

The **General Manual, Policies and Procedures** of the San Antonio Police Department, Procedure 501, says:

“Officers shall use only the level of force that is necessary to accomplish a lawful police objective.” (501.02.B)

“Necessary Force” is defined as “The minimum amount of and degree of force sufficient to achieve a legitimate police objective.” (501.04.F)

In 1998, the San Antonio Police Department began collecting Use of Force (UOF) Reports, to satisfy the CALEA (Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies) requirements for accreditation. **CALEA Requirements for Accreditation**, Article 1.3.6, says:

“A written report is submitted whenever an employee:

- a. Discharges a firearm, for other than training purposes;*
- b. Takes an action that results in, or is alleged to have resulted in, injury or death of another person;*
- c. Applies force through use of lethal or less-than-lethal weapons;*
- d. Applies weaponless physical force at a level as defined by the agency.”*

It is important to note that CALEA does not set the “level of [weaponless] force” that would necessitate a UOF Report be produced; nor is there any national

standard or national guideline for producing UOF Reports and tracking UOF data. This makes it difficult, it not impossible, for any comparisons to be made between law enforcement agencies concerning the level, nature, or frequency of UOF. Each agency sets its own policies and procedures for reporting and gathering data.

In 1999 and 2001, the SAPD UOF Report Form, as well as the requirements for using the form as set out in the SAPD Policies and Procedures (Procedure 501), were revised to the current format and requirements which are still in effect today. SAPD Procedure 501 requires that:

“Officers using any type of force except, verbal persuasion, open/empty hand control techniques, or the brandishing or displaying of a weapon in accordance with Section .05, Subsection D. of this procedure, shall report the incident to a supervisory officer as soon as possible and document the use of force in writing by completing SAPD Form 62-UOF, Use of Force Report. The written report must be completed and turned in before the end of the officer’s tour of duty.”
(SAPD 501.09A.)

“Open/Empty-Hand Control”


“... means using physical force to manipulate a person’s arms and hands during handcuffing, and the support provided a handcuffed person while walking, turning, or entering and exiting a vehicle. This force includes, but is not limited to, physical touching, gripping or holding, pain compliance measures, pressure point applications, come-alongs, takedowns, or other custodial techniques.”
(SAPD 501.04.H)

SAPD provides extensive training to cadets on the legal and appropriate Use of Force, and teaches a Use of Force Continuum, following the scale set out in Procedure 501.03.B:

“In the course of discharging their duty, police officers are often confronted with situations requiring some degree of force to be exercised in order to effect and maintain public order and safety. This may be achieved on an ascending scale of advice, warning, persuasion, physical or deadly force, according to and proportional with the circumstances of the situation. The application of force must be conducted in a manner that is reasonable and commensurate to achieving a level of control that cannot otherwise be obtained through the use of other alternatives.”

The training class includes a graphic of the “UOF Continuum” which divides the levels into officer presence, verbal communication, weaponless strategies, weapon strategies, and deadly force.

SAPD USE OF FORCE CONTINUUM



In 2001, SAPD received grant funding from the U.S. Department of Justice under the “Creating a Culture of Integrity Initiative.” The grant funds were used to conduct two studies: a study of the Use of Force Reports, and a study of the Racial Profiling Data (collected since 2001, as required by state law). Dr. William Terrill was selected through the Request for Proposal (RFP) process by an SAPD panel from a list of applicants to produce the UOF Reports Study. Dr. Terrill selected the period July 1, 2001 through December 31, 2002 for his study. He was provided with copies of the UOF Reports from that period, as well as the information in the Reports from the UOF database. In addition, Dr. Terrill was provided with supplementary data on crimes, arrests, and complaints, as well as more detailed information on the racial and geographic distribution of arrests, warrants, persons on probation and parole, and complaints, officer demographics, officer assignments, and city and patrol district demographics (2000 Census).

The initial drafts, as submitted by Dr. Terrill to SAPD, as well as the Final Report (submitted on September 24, 2003, then re-submitted with corrections of data errors on November 6, 2003), contains an analysis of the UOF Report data, analysis of supplementary data, and a series of “concerns” and “recommendations”. SAPD has taken Dr. Terrill’s “Use of Force Analysis”, and building on his basic analysis of the UOF data, and his “concerns”, continued with a more in-depth analysis of the UOF Reports and comparative data, and produced the following “SAPD Response to Dr. Terrill’s Use of Force Study.”

SAPD RESPONSE TO DR. TERRILL’S USE OF FORCE STUDY

DR. TERRILL’S FIRST CONCERN:

“When comparing percentages of force usage to the total population, Hispanics and Blacks are over-represented in the force data set.” (p.68)

Dr. Terrill also suggests that SAPD “focus more on why UOF disparities occur.” (p.76)

SAPD RESPONSE:

Issue: Dr. Terrill relied on comparisons of Use of Force to the total population for his analysis and as part of his major “concern”. The Use of Force by police officers is not a result of being in the total population, it can be a result of police-citizen contact during arrest encounters. Use of Force ratios should be compared to a variety of data sets, such as Crimes, Calls for Service, and Arrests, not exclusively to total population.

In this particular case, with UOF Reports involving Black citizens comprising 15.2% of the total UOF Reports, Dr. Terrill did offer the following: “Without documenting the frequency or level of citizen resistance one does not know whether disparity can be attributed to differences in citizen behavior or the result of race itself.”(p.68)

SAPD Analysis of “why” this disparity exists:

Arrest data by crime and race for the 18-month period under study shows without question Blacks are arrested for crimes where resistance to arrest (and thereby resulting in UOF) is more frequent: the crimes of Assault, Narcotics, Evading Arrest, and Warrants.

For the 18 months	Hispanic	Black	White	Other
Population	59.5%	6.6%	32.3%	1.6%
Total Arrests	55.8%	13.2%	29.6%	1.4%
Assault Arrests	68.1%	12.9%	19.9%	0.9%
Narcotics Arrests	58.3%	20.5%	20.8%	0.4%
Escape/Evade Arrests	66.7%	15.2%	18.2%	0.0%
Warrant Arrests	63.7%	15.3%	20.6%	0.0%
Use of Force	64.9%	15.1%	19.4%	0.6%

Warrant arrests are particularly relevant, as the citizen with the warrant has in most cases already been in jail, or knows that if caught, they are going directly to jail, and will more likely do whatever they can to avoid capture, including fleeing, resisting, and fighting. The percentages of racial groups arrested during the 18-month period for Warrants, together with Evading Arrest, most closely parallel the percentages for Use of Force. During the 18-month period analyzed, SAPD arrested (custodial) or issued Class C Citations (non-traffic) to over 54,000 persons. Of these, SAPD handcuffed and took to

the Magistrate or to County Juvenile detention (custodial arrest) 41,142 adults and juveniles.

- Black = 5,313 (12.9% of adults and juveniles arrested)
- Hispanic = 21,719 (52.8%)
- White = 14,105 (34.3%)

Of the 5,313 Blacks who were placed under custodial arrest, SAPD used Force on 133 persons. This is:

- 2.5% of the Total Blacks arrested.
- For Hispanics, the number is 566 (2.6%).
- For Whites the number is 183 (1.3%).

SAPD conducted a more detailed review of the 133 UOF Reports on Black citizens, and reviewed the criminal and arrest records of the individuals upon whom force was used.

Of the 133 Blacks on whom Force was used:

- 67 (50%) had outstanding warrants.
- 34 (25%) had narcotics in their possession.
- 52 (39%) had been involved in Assaults or other Disturbances.
- 10 were “second parties”, and interfered with the Police Officer as he tried to arrest another person.
- 85% had prior arrest records for narcotics or violent crimes, including prior arrests for “resisting arrest” or “evading arrest”.
- 85 (64%) were arrested in High-Crime, MAP-Target patrol districts.

Only 18 did not have prior records or warrants (as adults). Of those 18:

- 9 were contacted after police were dispatched for assaults or other violence.
- 2 were traffic-related (DWI and a Vehicle Theft chase).
- 5 were for persons intoxicated or otherwise mentally impaired and disruptive.
- 2 were contacted by the police on “site” and were found to have narcotics in their possession.

Arrests of Black Citizens

Does SAPD arrest Black citizens at a disproportionate rate?

Is SAPD targeting Blacks for arrest?

Local, state and national arrest data suggests that SAPD is not targeting Blacks disproportionately. Arrests of Blacks for crimes where police initiate the contact (Narcotics, Warrants, Resisting Arrest, Illegal Carrying of Firearms) are at a rate more than two to three times the ratio of Blacks in the San Antonio population. However, the arrests of Blacks for crimes where the victim provides the identification, or the suspect is caught in the act (Murder, Robbery, Assaults), are also two to three times the population ratio.

1. During 2002, in San Antonio, Blacks were 6.3% of the population and 13% of all persons placed in custodial arrest. Blacks were also:
 - a. 20% of persons arrested for Murder.
 - b. 23% of persons arrested for Robbery.
 - c. 13% of persons arrested for Assault.
 - d. 20% of persons arrested for Narcotics.
 - e. 20% of persons arrested for Illegal Carrying of a Firearm.
 - f. 15% of persons arrested for Warrants
 - g. 16% of persons arrested for Resisting or Obstructing.
 - h. 13% of ALL arrests.
2. In Texas during 2002, Blacks were 12% of the population, and:
 - a. 30% of persons arrested for Murder.
 - b. 42% of persons arrested for Robbery.
 - c. 25% of persons arrested for Assault.
 - d. 29% of arrests for Narcotics.
 - e. 22% of ALL arrests.
3. Nationally, during 2002, Blacks were 12.3% of the population, and:
 - a. 50% of persons arrested for Murder.
 - b. 54% of persons arrested for Robbery.
 - c. 32% of persons arrested for Assault.
 - d. 33% of arrests for Narcotics.
 - e. 29% of persons ALL arrests.

(Data sources: SAPD, DPS, FBI)

Based on this data, it does not appear that SAPD arrests Black citizens at a rate that is as high as the National arrest rates for major crimes, nor higher than the Texas arrest rates for most crimes.

DR. TERRILL’S SECOND CONCERN:

“Two areas, (Central and West) account for nearly half of all reported force.” (p.68)
 Dr. Terrill asks: “Are officers working these areas encountering that much more citizen resistance, prompting such disparity in force usage?” “Alternatively, it is possible that officers in other areas (i.e. North, East, South, Prue) are under-reporting their force usage, and that offices in the Central and West are not using force more.” (pp.68-69) Terrill continues: “Additionally, the rate of force in the Central, in relation to calls for service and when considering the extent of reported crime, is substantially higher than any of the other service areas of the city.” (p.69)

SAPD RESPONSE:

Issue: It is important not to rely just on statistics, but also on the context and the nature of crime in Central and West, and the relationship between Use of Force and “crime”. Utilizing crime data by type of crime, and arrest data by type of crime and race of arrested person, for all areas of the city, provides a more accurate basis for evaluation. (The problem with using “total” Part I and Part II Crimes, is that they are 70% Property Crimes, dominated by Larceny/Theft, Burglary, Criminal Mischief and Forgery, for

which arrests are seldom made at the scene, but are instead made from warrants issued and executed later. A patrol district could be high in overall crime, without having high adversarial or arrest contacts between police and suspects.)

SAPD Analysis of “why” the disparities exist:

The near-west side of San Antonio, along the Central-West border, is a traditionally high-crime, high-violence and high-narcotics area. Officers making arrests for violent crimes, narcotics and warrants are more likely to meet resistance, necessitating force to complete the arrest. In addition, during 2001 and 2002, the patrol districts bordering both the Central and West service areas were “MAP Target Areas” for crime reduction, through the tactics of Directed Patrol, narcotics raids, warrant roundups, and other proactive policing activities that resulted in the arrest of a large number of suspects for assaults, narcotics, and warrants, as well as for other crimes.

Analysis of Crime and Arrest data from Central and West shows:

- Central and West have 40% of all arrests, city-wide, and particularly for the offenses that appear to correlate with resistance to arrest by the offender:
 - 45% of Assault Arrests
 - 47% of Narcotics Arrests
 - 47% of Warrant Arrests

- In addition, Central and West have the highest rates of Violent Crimes per square mile, and Central has the highest Violent Crime Rate per 10,000 population and the highest Narcotics Crime Rate per 10,000 population.

SUBSTATION	VIOLENT CRIMES	VIOLENT CRIME RATE/SQ. MILE	VIOLENT CRIME RATE/10K POP	NARCOTICS CRIME RATE/10K POP
Central	6,649	311.4	549.6	171.0
West	9,397	117.5	365.9	59.0
South	6,218	105.8	435.9	79.4
East	5,333	102.6	479.8	128.7
Prue	6,544	66.4	228.1	37.6
North	6,084	58.9	270.2	40.3

Data is for the 18-month period under study.

DR. TERRILL’S THIRD CONCERN:

“Higher force (UOF) reporting officers are more likely to be young, work Central and West areas, and work C-shift.” (p.69)

SAPD RESPONSE:

Issue: All new SAPD officers are assigned to Patrol, and predominate on C-shift (2200-0600). Work assignments are based on vacancies, seniority (for shift selection), and staffing needs. A Manpower Deployment Analysis is undertaken about every 14 weeks, and officers are given the opportunity to apply for reassignment to any shift and/or substation. Patrol Officer deployment by substations is:


CENTRAL	EAST	NORTH	PRUE	SOUTH	WEST
149	116	140	175	117	173


SAPD Analysis of “why” the disparities exist:

Central and West, with 322 of the 870 assigned Patrol positions, has 37% of the Patrol Officers city-wide, and 40% of all arrests. Central and West on C-shift, Friday and Saturday nights, are the busiest (for calls and arrests). It would be logical to assume that they would also be the busiest for UOF Reports. (SEE GRAPHS BELOW)

The two graphics below illustrate the concentration of Central and West Patrol UOF Reports on the C-shift, on Friday night/Saturday morning, and on Saturday night/Sunday morning.

Officers assigned to Central and West wrote 49% of the UOF Reports, and made 40% of all arrests, including 45% of Assault arrests, 47% of Narcotics arrests, and 47% of Warrant arrests.





DR. TERRILL’S FOURTH CONCERN:

“Officers involved in more force incidents are more likely to have a higher number of citizen complaints.” (p.69)

SAPD RESPONSE:

Issue: During the 18-month period studied, there were 90 citizen complaints on Use of Force filed with the SAPD Internal Affairs Unit. After investigation, 3 of these complaints were found to be valid, with penalties of suspensions of 15 days, 3 days and 1 day. These 90 complaints were only .17% of the total number of arrests that occurred during the 18-month period.

SAPD Analysis of “why” disparities exist:

Officers who make more arrests increase the possibility of having to use force and may generate more opportunities for citizen complaints. Officers in Central and West make 40% of the arrests made city-wide, which would lead to an increased opportunity for citizen complaints. There are five officers (all Central C-shift or West C-shift) who wrote more than 10 each UOF Reports during the 18-month period. Further research and analysis shows that these were highly productive officers, with higher-than-average numbers of arrests. The arrest averages of these five officers was 537 arrests each, compared with an average of 280 arrests for officers who wrote no UOF Reports during this period. One of the officers with more than 10 UOF Reports had 790 arrests during the 18 months, another had 631 arrests.

DR. TERRILL’S FIFTH CONCERN:

“Supervisors only show up to the scene 50% of the time.” (p.69)

SAPD RESPONSE:

Issue: SAPD Policy 501.09.B, says:

“It is recommended that a supervisor make the scene of any incident where the officer has reported that force was used in order to ensure that proper departmental procedures are followed.”

Supervisors review all Arrest Reports and all UOF Reports, and do go to the scene of the incidents whenever possible, but the unpredictable and volatile nature of the UOF incidents makes it impossible for a 100% supervisory response. In addition, as shown in the charts above, many of the UOF incidents are concentrated on the busiest nights of the week (Friday and Saturday nights) and the busiest shift (C-shift). Without an increase in the number of supervisors assigned on these nights, it is not possible for a supervisor to personally visit each incident.

Dr. Terrill suggests that supervisors not only visit each UOF scene, but also interview witnesses and participants at the scene. Ideally, in calm situations, this would be a useful activity. UOF scenes are frequently highly-charged, with agitated by-standers, large crowds, and the potential for further violent incidents. SAPD officers are trained to remove themselves and their prisoners as soon as possible from these volatile scenes, to de-escalate the incident. Analysis of UOF Reports on 133 Black arrestees showed that at least 10 Reports were filed on a “third party” arrestee, a person who was not the original target of officer action, but one who interfered with the officer, often physically interfered, as the officer was attempting to arrest the original target. By the time the officers and the prisoners have been removed from the scene, and the crowd has dispersed, a supervisor would have little reason to visit the location.

DR. TERRILL’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EFFORTS:

Dr Terrill made a series of recommendations for “Future Efforts”. The recommendations, and SAPD After Actions are listed below.

1. Alter and improve the UOF Report Form.
 - SAPD is designing a new UOF Report Form to capture additional information suggested by Dr. Terrill. The new UOF Report Form will include additional information on:
 - The behavior of the suspect that led the officer to use force.
 - Any conflict of violence prior to officer/suspect contact.
 - The situation (dispatched call, officer initiated, type of crime, etc.) that led to the initial contact between the officer and the suspect.
 - The type of weapon used by the officer.
 - Any weapon used by the suspect.

- Any injury to the officer.
 - Any injury to the suspect, and indication as to whether it was caused by the Use of Force or was from some other source.
 - Additional officers and other persons at the scene.
 - Addition of an “Assisting Officer’s Supplement Report Form”.
2. Have supervisors visit the scene of the Use of Force incident.
 - SAPD is studying methods to improve oversight that would not be cost prohibitive.
 3. Have supervisors interview all participants.
 - SAPD is reviewing its policies concerning supervisory involvement in UOF incidents.
 4. Prepare UOF Reports when Suspects use force.
 - SAPD is changing the UOF Form to include this information.
 5. Incorporate UOF Continuum into SAPD Policy.
 - SAPD General Manual Policy on UOF is being reviewed to include additional UOF guidelines.
 6. Include UOF data in the Early Warning System criteria.
 - SAPD Internal Affairs is reviewing the best way to implement this recommendation.
 7. Integrate various officer and complaint databases.
 - UOF and Internal Affairs databases are being redesigned to reflect this integration.
 8. Expand UOF Report Narrative (include circumstances and sequence).
 - The UOF Report is being expanded to include this information.
 9. Focus more on “why” UOF disparities occur.
 - The expanded UOF Report and the integrated databases will make more meaningful analysis possible.

SUMMATION:

Dr. Terrill’s “UOF Analysis” produced the following Conclusions:

- Dr. Terrill has not seen evidence that force has been used excessively or inappropriately.
- Dr. Terrill has not identified evidence of SAPD “targeting” of Blacks or Hispanics for Use of Force.
- Statistically, Blacks and Hispanics are over-represented in the UOF Report dataset. (SAPD research shows that SAPD officers come into contact with Blacks and Hispanics in 70% of arrest situations.)
- Statistically, Force is more often used in Assault, Evading, and Narcotics arrests. (SAPD research shows that Blacks and Hispanics make up 80% of Assault Arrests and 79% of Narcotics Arrests.)
- Dr. Terrill concludes that: “SAPD officers use force rather sparingly.”

As a result of Dr. Terrill's Report, SAPD found through further analysis:

- **There was no evidence of systematic targeting or Civil Rights violations.**
- **Use of Force is related to Arrest, not to Population or Calls for Service.**
- **Use of Force is related to involvement in Violent Crime.**
- **The new UOF Report will make analysis and tracking more efficient.**

SOURCES:

SAPD Records Office

SAPD General Manual of Policies and Procedures

Texas Penal Code

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

Texas Department of Public Safety: Crime in Texas 2002

Federal Bureau of Investigation: Crime in the United States 2002

United States Code (U.S.C.), Title 18 (Civil Rights)

CALEA: Requirements for Accreditation

DISCLAIMER

This project was support by grant #2002HSWX0032 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Point of view or opinions contained in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.